Who should lead raw materials collection considering regulatory pressure and technological innovation？

Zhang, Cuihua; Lyu, Ruxia; Li, Zhitang; MacMillen, Simeon J.

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.126762

Cited by 15 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With the increasing attention to green logistics, some scholars have introduced the platform cost-sharing into the field of green logistics for research (Song and Wang, 2020;Zhang et al, 2021). Cai et al (2021) analyzed the problems existing in the transaction orders of the shared logistics platform, and suggested the optimal subsidy scheme based on the analysis.…”

Section: The Impact Of Platform Cost-sharing On Green Logisticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A tripartite evolutionary game for the regional green logistics: the roles of government subsidy and platform's cost-sharing

Zhang

Wang²,

Wang³

et al. 2022

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PurposeAlthough green logistics has become a new focus of cooperation between government and enterprises under environmental constraints, how local governments formulate subsidy policies to effectively guide the green transformation of regional logistics and how to facilitate the reasonable cost-sharing are rather critical. This paper will deeply explore the dynamic process of the tripartite participation (government, platform, and logistics enterprises) in the selection of regional green logistics strategy, and reveal the evolutionary game relationship of the three parties.Design/methodology/approachTo explore the dynamics involving the government, platform and logistics enterprises for the green logistic transformation, and reveal the evolutionary gaming among the three parties, based on the bounded rationality premise, this study constructs the tripartite asymmetric evolutionary game models, uses the stability theorem of differential equation to explore the evolution and stability strategy of the system in different cases and explicates the paths of influence on the tripartite behaviors via simulations.FindingsResults of this study indicate that there exist stable equilibrium strategies among the three parties regarding the regional green logistics, and they are affected by different factors. The government's subsidy, subsidy intensity and the platform's cost-sharing proportion can generate positive effects, but the latter two can also impact negatively beyond the effective ranges. The findings provide a theoretical basis for local governments, platforms and logistics enterprises to formulate justifiable subsidy intensity and determine reasonable sharing proportion.Originality/valueFirstly, considering the significant relevance of local government, it is included in the evolution model, and the tripartite game (among government, platform and enterprises) is explored; Secondly, by comparing the equilibrium results under different game conditions, this paper analyzes the evolution of each party's game strategy to achieve the optimal return under bounded rationality and the important factors determining the strategic selection; Finally, the key factor of platform cost sharing is involved, and to what extent the change of platform cost sharing ratio will influence the systematic stability is explored.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Impact Of Platform Cost-sharing On Green Logisticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A tripartite evolutionary game for the regional green logistics: the roles of government subsidy and platform's cost-sharing

Zhang

Wang²,

Wang³

et al. 2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…The results showed that implementing a deposit refund system always benefits the online platform economically and contributes to environmental benefits. Zhang et al [36] analyzed who should lead recycling in the setting of regulatory pressure and technological innovation from the perspectives of environmental benefits, economic benefits, and social welfare. They found that online platform-led recycling is optimal in terms of social welfare and environmental benefits, while manufacturer-led recycling performs best economically when fixed costs are appropriate.…”

Section: Strategic Decisions Of E-clscmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Blockchain Technology Adoption on an E-Commerce Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Consumer Trust

Ma,

2024

Sustainability

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This paper analytically explores the value of blockchain technology in building consumer trust in recyclers. We focus on an e-commerce closed-loop supply chain composed of an online platform and a manufacturer. In the forward chain, the platform selects a reselling or marketplace model to sell products. In the reverse chain, the platform collects used products, and the unknown whereabouts of the used products will cause consumer mistrust and be detrimental to the corporate image. Blockchain technology can address these challenges by improving the visibility of the recycling chain. By constructing differential game models, we specify the conditions for blockchain implementation and explore its impact on the online sales model choice and the E-CLSC performance. The findings show that the manufacturer consistently benefits from blockchain technology, while the platform decides to adopt it when the long-term profits outweigh the initial investment costs. Interestingly, the sales model selection will not change with the advent of blockchain technology. We further show the benefits of blockchain-enabled recycling and provide tangible insights for related practitioners.

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“…Among the papers we include in this survey, the government's passive role influenced firm strategies and, consequently, the course of the game through the following mechanisms: taxing the waste produced [38]; exogenous emissions cap [39]; a carbon tax and trade-in subsidy for new products [40]; subsidies or tax exemptions for increasing the recycling rate, the eco-design, remanufacturing, or the return rate [41][42][43][44][45][46]; carrot and stick policy where a subsidy is given to the consumer for trade-in and purchasing a new product while a tax is imposed on emissions [47]; rewards based on the recycling rate, and punishment based on the used products that were not recycled [48]; reward-penalty mechanisms based on collection target quantity [49,50]; reward-penalty mechanism based on collection target quantity and reward-penalty intensity [51]; and fixing the return level based on which firms experience a reward or penalty [52]. Among the other passive schemes available, the literature has particularly emphasized green deals and identifying regulations to influence consumers' environmental awareness [53]; setting either a baseline or premium warranty [54]; defining compensation equal to the salvage value of the used product [55]; defining carbon trading and carbon emissions [56,57]; setting a carbon cap, carbon offset, or carbon trade [58]; setting a greening level threshold [59], setting the level of technology intensity [60], and setting the reward and penalty mechanisms [61][62][63].…”

Section: Active and Passive Government Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

A Selected Survey of Game Theory Models with Government Schemes to Support Circular Economy Systems

De Giovanni,

Ramani

2023

Sustainability

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This paper reviews the public schemes and mechanisms available for firms to activate and successfully organize circular economy settings. Because of the nature of such negotiated incentives, we focus this survey on game theory models and emphasize three main fields: (1) analysis of public schemes proposed by governments to sponsor the formation of circular economy systems; (2) investigation of government actions in sponsoring these schemes, which can either be active or passive; and (3) analysis of circular economy options used in game theory with government interventions, linked to the waste pyramid framework. Within these fields, we identify six research gaps that future research can address to contribute to this domain’s knowledge. Furthermore, by crossing these three dimensions, we derive 200 possible fields that can be populated with future research and emphasize the ones that require more contributions from researchers in the future.

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Who should lead raw materials collection considering regulatory pressure and technological innovation？

Cited by 15 publications

References 46 publications

A tripartite evolutionary game for the regional green logistics: the roles of government subsidy and platform's cost-sharing

A tripartite evolutionary game for the regional green logistics: the roles of government subsidy and platform's cost-sharing

The Impact of Blockchain Technology Adoption on an E-Commerce Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Consumer Trust

A Selected Survey of Game Theory Models with Government Schemes to Support Circular Economy Systems

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