Who supports secession? The determinants of secessionist attitudes among Turkey's Kurds

Abstract

Who supports secession in a multiethnic country? What factors lead to secessionist or separatist attitudes? Despite the substantial interest in secessionist movements, the micro-level factors and dynamics behind mass support for secession have been understudied. Using original and comprehensive data derived from two public opinion surveys, conducted in 2011 and 2013 with nationwide, representative samples, this study investigates the determinants of separatist attitudes among Turkey's Kurds. The empirical results show that perceptions of discrimination, ideological factors (i.e. a left-right division and partisanship), region and religious sect do affect support for secession. Our findings provide strong support for the grievance theory and, further, show that ideology is an important factor. However, the results call into question arguments drawing attention to the role of modernisation (i.e. socio-economic status) and of religiosity. The study also discusses some practical implications of the empirical findings.

Ethnicity and Elections in Eastern Turkey: What do the Kurds Want?

“…16 Two research conducted in 2011 and 2013 confirm that the support among Kurds for the options of independent Kurdistan and autonomy was more than expected in the Turkish public and bureaucracy. According to the findings of this research, 66 percent of Kurdish citizens endorse autonomy, and 32 percent support secession (Sarıgil & Karakoç, 2016, p. 327). Interestingly, the findings of this The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) funded research were not made public in Turkey and in Turkish.…”

“…While Cuma Çiçek (2017) has described the main patterns in the election results in Kurdish towns, Faruk Ekmekçi (2011a) briefly analyzed the extent to which the Kurds supported the pro-Kurdish party in the elections in 2011. The impact of socioeconomic status and religiosity on Kurds’ party choices and the extent to which Kurds support the demands of education in Kurdish and self-rule for Kurds, on the other hand, have lately been investigated by Zeki Sarıgil (2010), Faruk Ekmekçi (2011a), Zeki Sarıgil and Omer Fazlıoğlu (2013), Zeki Sarıgil and Ekrem Karakoç (2016).…”

Ethnic and Religious Prejudices in the Turkish Social Landscape

“…Furthermore, since the early 1980s, the Kurdish ethnopolitical movement in both peaceful and violent forms has posed a major challenge to the Turkish state and the official understanding of national identity, which has been based on Turkishness (see Kiris¸c¸i and Winrow, 1997;Bruinessen, 2000;Ye gen, 2004Ye gen, , 2009Marcus, 2007;Watts, 2010;Gunes, 2012;Romano and Gurses, 2014;Aydin and Emrence, 2015;Sarigil and Karakoc, 2016). As the dominant or hegemonic group, Sunni-Turks might consider the Kurdish challenge a major threat to their dominant status in the public realm and so develop a relatively stronger negative attitude towards the Kurdish ethnic out-group.…”

Anatomy of a Civil War

“…Furthermore, while the Kurds by and large are willing to support a peaceful and democratic coexistence with the majority Turks (Kibris 2011), the conflict has begun to erode their hopes for living together in harmony. Results from two nationwide surveys conducted in 2011 and 2013 show that despite relatively higher support for autonomy among the Kurds, support for secession has increased from 23.3 percent to 32.1 percent in two years (Sarigil and Karakoc 2016). The continuation of unequal treatment of the Kurds coupled with dramatic changes taking place in Turkey and neighboring Syria and Iraq, which have largely worked in favor of Kurds in these countries, are likely to feed their desire for secession.…”