‘Who wants to cover everything, covers nothing’: the organization of indigenous security forces in Indonesia, 1945–50

Frakking, Roel

doi:10.4324/9781315767345-6

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“…67 Every district was given the responsibility to 63 The research team noted that although the analytical concept of extreme violence refers to violence that was largely used outside direct regular combat situations against civilians or fighters, the fact shows that extreme violence was carried out within regular combat, risking civilian casualties (Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie (NIMH), and NIOD Instituut voor Oorlogs 2022, 109). 64 Sapto 2018 65 Sapto 2018, 109-112 66 See Frakking 201467 Sapto 2018 provide food, money, and travel funds for the military division within their area. 68 This policy was very hard to control and often lead to the military's arbitrary act of seizing state-owned crops.…”

Section: Under the Changing State: Japanese Occupation And Independencementioning

confidence: 99%

Memory Culture of the Anti-Leftist Violence in Indonesia

Leksana¹

2023

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van de Water. Also to Geoffrey Robinson for his wonderful advice. Special thanks to Peter Keppy who pointed me to important colonial archives, and Sebastian Coops who helped me in translating and discovering more of them.This book was mostly written in the Netherlands, and because of this, I am most thankful to my friends who have always been supportive, Hoko Hori, Katja Paijens, Lennie Geerlings, Paula Hendrikx, and especially to my office room-mate Taufiq Hanafi. And to the Indonesian community who remedies loneliness;

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Section: Under the Changing State: Japanese Occupation And Independencementioning

confidence: 99%

Memory Culture of the Anti-Leftist Violence in Indonesia

Leksana¹

2023

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“…84 Attempts to coordinate the military strategy and civilian policy better came to naught. 85 Right at the end of the war, in March 1949, a Dutch battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel FOB Musch, came to the discovery that the insurgency could not be beaten just by military means, but that politics had to play a role as well. In a memorandum, he expressed sharp criticism of the Dutch strategy:…”

Section: What It Boils Down To On Military Strategic Level Is Explaimentioning

confidence: 99%

The Dutch Strategic and Operational Approach in the Indonesian War of Independence, 1945-1949

Scholtz

2019

SCIM

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The Indonesian War of Independence (1945-1949) and the Dutch attempt to combat the insurgency campaign by the Indonesian nationalists provides an excellent case study of how not to conduct a counter-insurgency war. In this article, it is reasoned that the Dutch security strategic objective-a smokescreen of autonomy while keeping hold of political power-was unrealistic. Their military strategic approach was very deficient. They approached the war with a conventional war mindset, thinking that if they could merely reoccupy the whole archipelago and take the nationalist leaders prisoner, that it would guarantee victory. They also mistreated the indigenous population badly, including several mass murders and other war crimes, and ensured that the population turned against them. There was little coordination between the civilian and military authorities. Two conventional mobile operations, while conducted professionally, actually enlarged the territory to be pacified and weakened the Dutch hold on the country. By early 1949, it was clear that the Dutch had lost the war, mainly because the Dutch made a series of crucial mistakes, such as not attempting to win the hearts and minds of the local population. In addition, the implacable opposition by the United States made their war effort futile.

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Insurgencies in Early Post-Colonial Indonesia

Keppy,

Luttikhuis,

Wahid

2023

The Oxford Handbook of Late Colonial Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies

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In the 1950s, shortly after independence from the Netherlands in 1949, Indonesia experienced a number of significant rebellions. These insurgencies were part of a much greater number of smaller outbursts of violence that are central here. They are of interest, firstly, as they invite us to question the common notion of tension between the regions and the political centre of the Republic of Indonesia. The cases in this essay demonstrate that smaller insurgencies occurred for a prolonged period in what are considered core centres of support for the Republic of Indonesia, i.e. Java and Sumatra. While the major rebellions aimed at overthrowing or breaking up the unitary state, the aims of the smaller insurgencies remained opaque. Some insurgencies aimed at transforming the incumbent government and its policies. Many, however, were of a vague politico-criminal and local nature. Secondly, a closer examination of the small insurgencies shows more clearly than the major recorded rebellions that the borders between insurgency, crime, and vigilantism were often blurred. Thirdly, many of these small insurgencies were not isolated incidents. We should rather consider them as integrated chains of events, often involving similar social groups, in most cases demobilized soldiers and guerrilla fighters.

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‘Who wants to cover everything, covers nothing’: the organization of indigenous security forces in Indonesia, 1945–50

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Memory Culture of the Anti-Leftist Violence in Indonesia

Memory Culture of the Anti-Leftist Violence in Indonesia

The Dutch Strategic and Operational Approach in the Indonesian War of Independence, 1945-1949

Insurgencies in Early Post-Colonial Indonesia

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