2015
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2393
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Whom are you promoting? Positive voluntary public disclosures and executive turnover

Abstract: Managerial summary: Given the organizational benefits of positive media coverage, the considerable effort that firms put into managing their image in the media is not surprising. We argue and show, however, that when a firm enhances its public image it also improves its executives' positions in the managerial labor market and, by so doing, increases their likelihood

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
21
0

Year Published

2017
2017
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
5
1
1

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 42 publications
(21 citation statements)
references
References 139 publications
(181 reference statements)
0
21
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Yet, employee know‐how that is also of value to competing companies offers no such protective shield, as employees with valuable knowledge can walk out the door to join a rival firm or create a new venture (Coff, ; Ganco et al, ; Kacperczyk, , ; Starr, Balasubramanian, & Sakakibara, ), taking their knowledge away from the focal firm to the new employer. Moreover, competing firms may actively poach employees with valuable knowledge to gain access to the focal firm's knowledge sources and technological expertise ( Businessweek, ; Rao & Drazin, ; Stern & James, ). Both can have dire consequences for the focal firm as they facilitate technological knowledge transfer (e.g., Agarwal et al, ; Almeida & Kogut, ; Rosenkopf & Almeida, ; Song, Almeida, & Wu, ) and enhance the rival firm's product innovation (Rao & Drazin, ).…”
Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet, employee know‐how that is also of value to competing companies offers no such protective shield, as employees with valuable knowledge can walk out the door to join a rival firm or create a new venture (Coff, ; Ganco et al, ; Kacperczyk, , ; Starr, Balasubramanian, & Sakakibara, ), taking their knowledge away from the focal firm to the new employer. Moreover, competing firms may actively poach employees with valuable knowledge to gain access to the focal firm's knowledge sources and technological expertise ( Businessweek, ; Rao & Drazin, ; Stern & James, ). Both can have dire consequences for the focal firm as they facilitate technological knowledge transfer (e.g., Agarwal et al, ; Almeida & Kogut, ; Rosenkopf & Almeida, ; Song, Almeida, & Wu, ) and enhance the rival firm's product innovation (Rao & Drazin, ).…”
Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When there are high levels of information asymmetries, hiring firms are less likely to poach employees and those who are actually high quality may face a lemons discount when they consider other options in the labor market, thus constraining employee mobility. When information about the value of an employee becomes less ambiguous, for example through voluntary disclosures about value creation and value appropriation strategies of the firm, the likelihood that employees will be poached increases (Stern & James, 2016).…”
Section: Divergent Labor Market Frictionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Coupled with leader migration, falling average leader tenures has led to the creation of a labour market for experienced leaders (Zhang, ) who have a leadership track record that boards can assess in the hiring process. This process is being aided increasingly by enhanced media coverage of the leadership position (Malmendier and Tate, ; Stern and James, ). Hence, we suggest that, in such settings, boards will face greater asymmetric information about inside compared with outside leader candidates’ competencies as leader in the hiring process.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The scrutiny of leaders has increased through the rise in media (and analyst) coverage, which has led to greater reporting of leaders' actions and the rise of celebrity status (Malmendier and Tate, 2009). Such media attention changes the informational dynamics that shape succession decisions for internal and external leader candidates (Malmendier and Tate, 2009;Stern and James, 2016). In addition, falling average leader tenure has created a labour market of experienced leaders (Zhang, 2011), with a concomitant increase in the proportion of leaders appointed from outside the organization Neilson, 2015, 2013) 2 with prior leader experience (Bragaw and Misangyi, 2016;Hamori and Koyuncu, 2015;Karlsson and Neilson, 2009;Zhang, 2011).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%