Whose resources are they anyway? ‘Development assistance’ and community development agreements in the Mongolian mining sector

Abstract

This is a case study of 'development assistance' that demonstrates how the interests of the supposed beneficiary of such assistance -Mongolia -were discarded as soon as there appeared to be the slightest risk that, if served, those interests might have jeopardized the economic or political interests of the donor country (Switzerland) and/or those of its (Western) trading partners and their mining corporations. Donor interests were deemed to be put at risk by a government and donor sponsored research report that made a case for strengthening mining legislation pertaining to community development agreements in Mongolia. The offending research report also challenged the establishment view of the aetiology of the 'resource curse', emphasizing the predisposing conditions established by neoliberal design and international financial institutions and the roles of foreign mining corporations, which are rarely mentioned in conventional accounts. The case provides further evidence for the view that Western 'development assistance' rendered by state capitalist 'democracies' (and others) is first and foremost designed, directly or indirectly, to serve the interests of the countries providing such 'assistance' and that development rhetoric and practice is intended to create an impression of altruism where, in reality, little or none exists.

Policy paradigms, subnational governance and the state sovereignty gap in Afghanistan

“…Other ingredients of state sovereignty, such as investments in people and infrastructure and international relations, are compromised by such dependence, largely taken hostage by those who pay the piper as well as falling victim to predation by patronage networks 8 (e.g., Blunt, 2009;Blunt et al, 2012aBlunt et al, , 2012bghani and Lockhart, 2008).…”

Development Undone: Weber, Kafka and the Organisation of Supply-Side Vested Interests

“…They are, therefore, largely conjectural and are susceptible to intersubjective testing only to the limited extent that any of the social sciences can approach the Popperian epistemological ideal (Popper, 1963, 1970). It is one that the author has employed many times before (e.g., Blunt, 2012, 2014a, 2014b; Blunt & Turner, 2005; Blunt, Turner, & Lindroth, 2012; Blunt, Mamundzay, Yama, & Afghan, 2015; Blunt & Sainkhuu, 2015; Blunt & Khamoosh, 2016; Blunt, Mamundzay, & Nasary, 2017).…”

“…With few exceptions (e.g., Berenschot, 2018; Scambary, 2015), conceptions of what are the right technical things to do rely on neoliberal dogma and its expression via standard formulae—deregulation, privatisation, reductions in the size of government and control of the media (e.g., Chomsky, 1999, 2006; Klein, 2008; Blunt, 2014a). Weberian thinking about organisation is integral to this.…”

“…Four data sources are used to substantiate these claims (Blunt, 2014b; Blunt & Khamoosh, 2016; Blunt et al, 2015, 2017).…”

“…The concept note concluded unequivocally ‘We can think of no better or quicker or more cost effective way for government to build its credibility or establish its legitimacy in the eyes of the people than this’ (Blunt, 2014b, p. 4). Either (covert) donor policy or risk aversion on the part of donor officials meant that nothing was done.…”