Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes

Abstract

Why do nations create institutionalized modes of multilateral collaboration? How can common interests develop in the face of inequalities in power and asymmetries in interdependence? The author explores the role of knowledge in the definition of political objectives and interests. The systematic interplay of changing knowledge and changing objectives results in the redefinition of “issues” and the practice of “issue linkage.” The dynamics of issue-linkage, in turn, tell us something about international regimes for the management of progressively more complex issue areas. An ideal-typical “regime” is described, theoretically applicable to all types of issues. Since the cognitive attributes of the actors who set up such a regime cannot be expected to remain stable, this concept of a “regime” can illuminate cliscussion and analysis, but cannot be expected to provide a clear model for desirable policy. However, it can illustrate the options open to policy makers wishing to choose a mode of collaboration. Regimes dealing with money, the oceans, and technology transfer are used for illustrative purposes.

The Changing Position of the State and State Power in Global Affairs - Views from two scholars in International Political Economy

“…The respected IR scholar, Keohane (1983, in Young, 1996, saw the actors in international politics as states and governments. Haas (1980, in Young, 1996 points to the importance of state power (and government), and talks of interdependence and knowledge. Jervis (1988, in Young, 1996 also speaks from realist point of view and regards states as the main (only) actors.…”

Bargaining Model for the International Oil Industry

“…Issue linkage is a useful method for handling complexity. Issue linkage entails combining sub-issues that would be non-negotiable if treated separately into package deals and tradeoffs, and it allows for an endless variety of contextual factors that influence bargaining behavior and processes (Haas, 1980;Sebenius, 1983;Stein, 1980). The international oil industry is, as an issue area, not in isolation from the rest of society.…”

Positive und negative Koordination in Verhandlungssystemen

“…Aber auch dann wäre eine Annäherung an die Wohlfahrtseffekte des Coase-Theorems noch möglich, wenn separate Projekte mit komplementären Kosten-Nutzen-Bilanzen zu komplexen Verhandlungspaketen kom--biniert werden können, durch die eine im ganzen ausgeglichene Interessenbilanz erreicht wird (Scharpf 1992). Dementsprechend wird sowohl in den internationalen Beziehungen wie in der Innenpolitik die Bedeutung von "issue-linkage" und "log-rolling" als Strategie zur Überwindung von Verhandlungsblockaden seit langem anerkannt (Haas 1980;Stein 1980;Sebenius 1983;MacGinnis 1986;Weingast 1989). …”