Why Constructive Relativity Fails

Norton, John D.

doi:10.1093/bjps/axn046

Cited by 68 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…The last section has discussed how mass-energy-momentum density tensors can be derived in a Lagrangian framework, and that indeed this is only 33 In the 'constructive' approach towards special relativity, it has been argued that the metric should not be seen as an entity in its own right, but as merely encoding certain properties of the matter fields; see Brown [2005] and Brown and Pooley [2004] for advocacy, and Norton [2008] and Janssen [2007] for criticism of this position. An argument in support is that an unsatisfactory element of special relativity is believed to be that the metric seems to violate the action-reaction principle by acting without being acted upon: a feature we get rid of if the metric is conceived as encoding properties of the fully interacting matter fields.…”

Section: Metric Dependence In Generalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mass–Energy–Momentum: Only there Because of Spacetime?

Lehmkuhl¹

2011

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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I describe how relativistic field theory generalises the paradigm property of material systems, the possession of mass, to the requirement that they have a mass-energy-momentum density tensor T µν associated with them. I argue that T µν does not represent an intrinsic property of matter. For it will become evident that the definition of T µν depends on the metric field g µν in a variety of ways. Accordingly, since g µν represents the geometry of spacetime itself, the properties of mass, stress, energy and momentum should not be seen as intrinsic properties of matter, but as relational properties that material systems have only in virtue of their relation to spacetime structure.

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Section: Metric Dependence In Generalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mass–Energy–Momentum: Only there Because of Spacetime?

Lehmkuhl¹

2011

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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“…Far from being a remnant of foregone times, when the likes of Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn, and Feyerabend set out HPS as a distinctive discipline, contemporary philosophy of science has explored promising new ways of drawing on the history of science to illuminate both old and new philosophical problems. Be it foundational issues about spacetime theories (see, e.g., Norton , , ; and Howard , ) or the science of measurement or metrology (Chang ; Tal ; Teller ); be it realism and anti‐realism about science (Giere ; Stanford ; van Fraassen ), or the nature of scientific theories and models (Morrison ); be it biological complexity (Mitchell ) or the evolution of physical concepts (Arabatzis ), the many faces of contemporary HPS show how thriving the field is. A new national and international movement, called Integrated HPS, to which both of us have actively contributed since its foundation back in 2006, provide annual national and biennial international gatherings where the state of the art in the field is presented.…”

Section: A New Era For History and Philosophy Of Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophy of Science A Personal Peek into the Future

French

Massimi

2013

Metaphilosophy

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In this opinion piece, the authors offer their personal and idiosyncratic views of the future of the philosophy of science, focusing on its relationship with the history of science and metaphysics, respectively. With regard to the former, they suggest that the Kantian tradition might be drawn upon both to render the history and philosophy of science more relevant to philosophy as a whole and to overcome the challenges posed by naturalism. When it comes to the latter, they suggest both that metaphysics has much to learn from the philosophy of science and that it offers an array of tools that philosophers of science can themselves appropriate.

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“…The following brief (and admittedly incomplete) criticism of Brown's dynamical proposal (but see Dorato 2007 andNorton 2008) The main fact to rely upon at this point is that fourdimensional entities can be "sliced" in different ways: according to the frame of reference that we happen to choose, we obtain a different spatial section of a fourdimensional entity, in the same sense in which, by slicing a fourdimensionally conceived electromagnetic field, we obtain different but separate electrical and magnetic fields. The geometrical aspect provided by the "slicing" (a cross-section) is what makes the explanation of length-contraction mathematical, and therefore, in Clifton's sense, structural: we are simply locating length contraction (the phenomena to be explained) in the mathematical model of Minkowski spacetime (the explanans).…”

Section: Contractions Dilation and Structural Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structural Explanations in Minkowski Spacetime: Which Account of Models?

Dorato¹,

Felline

2010

Space, Time, and Spacetime

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In this paper we argue that structural explanations are an effective way of explaining wellknown relativistic phenomena like length contraction and time dilation, and then try to understand how this can be possible by looking at the literature on scientific models. In particular, we ask whether and how a model like that provided by Minkowski spacetime can be said to represent the physical world, in such a way that it can successfully explain physical phenomena structurally. We conclude by claiming that a partial isomorphic approach to scientific representation can supply an answer only if supplemented by a robust injection of pragmatic factors.In this paper we defend the thesis that structural explanations are an effective way of explaining well-known relativistic phenomena like length contraction and time dilation, and then try to understand how this can be possible by looking at the literature on scientific models. In particular, we ask whether and how Minkowski spacetime's model can be said to represent the physical world, in such a way that it can successfully explain physical phenomena structurally. In the first section, we try to briefly justify the above thesis by providing a brief sketch of structural explanations as they are used in Minkowski spacetime, in contrast to attempts at explaining the relativistic phenomena dynamically (Brown 2005). In the second section we offer a brief survey of the state of the art in the debate between the "representationalist" and the pragmatic conception of models, with particular attention to the inferentialist conception proposed by Suárez (1999Suárez ( , 2003Suárez ( , 2004. In the third section we argue that, in order both to solve some problems within Suárez's inferentialist approach and to account in a consistent way for the use that cognitive agents make of models, it is necessary to assume some kind of partial isomorphism between the mathematical model and the physical target. Our conclusion − the validity of which is here tested only in the specific case of structural explanations in Minkowski spacetime − makes the opposition between 2 the pragmatic and the semantic view look much more apparent than real, and in fact proposes a reconciliation between the two points of view already defended with a different emphasis by Debs and Redhead (2007). Contractions, dilation and structural explanationsSince the publication of Einstein's original paper on special relativity (SR), phenomena like rod contractions and clocks retardations have attracted the attention of philosophers. One of the key questions that has been raised by these phenomena from the very beginning was: are they real?Of course the answer to a question like this depends on what one means by the metaphysically appealing but philosophically treacherous adjective "real" in our context. If "real" means "measurable", then the answer ought to be an uncontroversial "YES" written in capital letters, as every experimental physicist working at Fermi Lab or at the LHC in Geneva could guarantee. If "real" m...

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Why Constructive Relativity Fails

Cited by 68 publications

References 6 publications

Mass–Energy–Momentum: Only there Because of Spacetime?

Mass–Energy–Momentum: Only there Because of Spacetime?

Philosophy of Science A Personal Peek into the Future

Structural Explanations in Minkowski Spacetime: Which Account of Models?

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