Why do entrepreneurs use franchising as a financial tool? An agency explanation

González-Dı́az, Manuel; Solís-Rodríguez, Vanesa

doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2011.03.001

Cited by 51 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 73 publications

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“…Our empirical approach uses a dynamic panel model drawing on data from French networks. The use of dynamic models in panel data analysis is still rare in the field of franchising but is gaining support (Gonzalez‐Diaz & Solis‐Rodriguez, ; Kacker, Dant, Emerson, & Coughlan, ). Previous works do not study contract duration, and they use dynamic models in view of their statistical advantages, in particular regarding the issue of endogeneity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contract duration and contractual learning: Evidence from franchising networks

et al. 2017

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contract duration and contractual learning: Evidence from franchising networks

et al. 2017

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“…Segundo Wu (2015), o franqueador, para reduzir os custos de agência e o oportunismo, necessita estabelecer mecanismos de controle e monitoramento, além de criar todo um aparato para os franqueados em prol da expansão da rede. Nesse sentido, ainda que o franqueador (principal) seja o detentor de informações, expertise e know-how fundamentais para o desenvolvimento da rede de franquia, caberá ao franqueado, que não possui tais atributos, operacionalizar a unidade de franquia no seu dia a dia e sentir-se atraído para novos investimentos (Garg, Priem, & Rasheed, 2013;Gonzalez-Diaz & Solis-Rodriguez, 2012). A Figura 1 também apresenta o monitoramento e capacidade de crescimento relativos, respectivamente, à manutenção e à expansão.…”

Section: Revisão Teóricaunclassified

Redes de Franquias Estrangeiras e Domésticas em um Mercado Emergente: Análise Comparativa

2018

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Resumo O artigo tem como objetivo analisar as diferenças existentes no processo de constituição das redes de franquias estrangeiras que atuam no mercado brasileiro e as redes de franquias domésticas brasileiras. Este processo compreende a instalação, a manutenção e a expansão das redes. A revisão teórica e o desenvolvido teórico se baseiam na Teoria da Agência e na Teoria da Escassez de Recursos. Por meio de uma regressão logística com 147 redes de franquias brasileiras e 41 redes de franquias estrangeiras em operação no mercado brasileiro, observou-se que as redes de franquias estrangeiras e domésticas se diferem nas três etapas do processo de constituição: instalação, manutenção e expansão. Complementarmente, foram realizadas três entrevistas semiestruturadas com três franqueadores de redes de franquias estrangeiras. Os resultados apontam que as franquias estrangeiras apresentam uma maior taxa de investimento e manutenção do que as redes de franquias brasileiras, no entanto exibem uma menor capacidade de monitoramento e controle do que as redes de franquias brasileiras. Por outro lado, ao contrário do esperado, observou-se que as redes de franquias estrangeiras atuantes no Brasil apresentam uma menor taxa de crescimento do que as redes de franquias domésticas deste país.

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“…Consistent with extant franchising literature (e.g., Combs, Michael, & Castrogiovanni, 2009;Gonzalez-Diaz & Solis-Rodriguez, 2012;Kacker et al, 2016;Lafontaine, 1992;Mitsuhashi, Shane, & Sine, 2008;Shane et al, 2006), we use lagged independent variables to account for endogeneity. Although these variables remain constant for many franchisors over several years, they are frequent strategic choices of the franchisor.…”

Section: Insert Tables 4 and 5 About Herementioning

confidence: 99%

Quality Signaling Through Ex-Ante Voluntary Information Disclosure in Entrepreneurial Networks: Evidence from Franchising

Sadeh

Kacker

2017

SSRN Journal

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This paper examines antecedents of ex-ante voluntary information disclosures for standardized contracts in entrepreneurial networks. Entrepreneurs (e.g., franchisors) may make such disclosures to prospective business partners in order to signal profitability of partnering, attract financial and managerial resources and develop their entrepreneurial networks. In practice, only a fraction of franchisors make financial performance representations (FPR), an ex-ante voluntary information disclosure to prospective franchisees. We address gaps in the signaling, voluntary information disclosure, franchising, entrepreneurship and small and medium enterprises (SME) literatures. We draw on signaling theory to develop a theoretical framework and investigate factors that influence a franchisor's disclosure decision. We evaluate hypotheses from our theoretical framework through econometric analyses of multi-sector panel data for the U.S. franchising industry. We estimate a logit model and use lagged independent variables to address our dichotomous independent variable and potential endogeneity respectively. Our results support the view that firms signal their quality through FPRs to attract potential business partners and expand their entrepreneurial networks. Beyond the extant literature, we find that a rigorous partner qualification mechanism is another driver of voluntary information disclosure in franchising. Our findings also provide empirical support for the complementary role played by multiple quality signaling mechanisms used by franchisors and yield public policy implications for franchising.

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Why do entrepreneurs use franchising as a financial tool? An agency explanation

Cited by 51 publications

References 73 publications

Contract duration and contractual learning: Evidence from franchising networks

Contract duration and contractual learning: Evidence from franchising networks

Redes de Franquias Estrangeiras e Domésticas em um Mercado Emergente: Análise Comparativa

Quality Signaling Through Ex-Ante Voluntary Information Disclosure in Entrepreneurial Networks: Evidence from Franchising

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