Why Do Some Oil-Producing Countries Succeed in Democracy While Others Fail?

Omgba, Luc Désiré

doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.07.005

Cited by 37 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Moreover, existing studies do not consider a crucial aspect at the heart of our analysis: the interplay between natural resources rents and the quality of institutions. A number of papers argue, and empirically demonstrate, that institutions can mitigate or even reverse the resource curse (e.g., Melhum et al, 2006;Brunnschweiler, 2008;Boschini et al, 2007;El Anshasy and Katsaiti, 2013;Hodler, 2010, 2014;Ebeke et al, 2015;Omgba, 2015). 4 Two explanations have been put forward to understand the role of institutions: the rent-seeking model (Tornell and Lane, 1999;Torvik, 2002;Melhum et al, 2006) and the patronage model (Robinson et al, 2006;Caselli and Cunningham, 2009).…”

Section: Resource Rents Fiscal Capacity and Political Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is There a Fiscal Resource Curse? Resource Rents, Fiscal Capacity and Political Institutions

2018

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Section: Resource Rents Fiscal Capacity and Political Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is There a Fiscal Resource Curse? Resource Rents, Fiscal Capacity and Political Institutions

2018

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“…A number of papers argue, and empirically demonstrate, that institutions can mitigate or even reverse the resource curse (e.g. Hodler 2010, 2014;Boschini et al 2007;Brunnschweiler 2008;Ebeke et al 2015;El Anshasy and Katsaiti 2013;Masi and Ricciuti 2019;Melhum et al 2006;Omgba 2015). 4 Two explanations have been put forward to understand the role of institutions: one emphasizes rent-seeking mechanisms (Melhum et al 2006;Tornell and Lane 1999;Torvik 2002), and the other patronage (Caselli and Cunningham 2009;Robinson et al 2006).…”

Section: Resource Rents Fiscal Capacity and Political Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is there a fiscal resource curse? Resource rents, fiscal capacity, and political institutions in developing economies

Masi¹,

Savoia²,

Sen³

2020

WIDER Working Paper

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States' fiscal capacity plays a pivotal role in developing economies, but it is less clear what its determinants are or what explains cross-country differences. We focus on the impact of natural resources. Standard arguments suggest that natural resources rents may reduce incentives to invest in fiscal capacity. However, political institutions that limit rulers' discretion over the use of resource revenues may mitigate or neutralize this negative effect. We investigate this hypothesis using panel data for 1995 to 2015 for 62 developing countries. The results suggest: (1) point-source resources are negatively associated with fiscal capacity, while diffuse resources are not; (2) developing economies with institutionalized executive constraints can neutralize the negative effect of point-source resources; (3) the effect of resource rents works mainly through institutions that make the tax system accountable and transparent. Thus it is possible to develop both fiscal capacity and the natural resources sector, without any trade-off.

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“…Even though the Nigerian economy is Africa's biggest (World Bank 2015), it is ranked very low on the UN's Human Development Index (UNDP 2015). Oil revenue ends up with political elites and does not benefit all citizens (Omgba 2015). The oil industry is also linked to several human rights violations, aside from the environmental harm.…”

Section: Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Waste crime from three criminological perspectives

Bisschop¹,

Huisman²

2018

Green Crimes and Dirty Money

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This paper focuses on the waste-crime nexus. We discuss which implications different criminological approaches to the waste-crime nexus and their respective etiological explanations and views on financial incentives hold for crime control and harm prevention. After all, the criminogenic opportunities of waste as a product and a sector are utilized by corporations as well as criminal organizations. This makes waste crime a topic of research for corporate crime and organized crime scholars. Moreover, waste crime is also a topic of green criminological research. For each of these three perspectives, we discuss what consequences the theories have for controlling and preventing waste crime and whether the contemporary regulation and enforcement answers to these requirements. Besides existing criminological studies on waste crime, this paper builds on the finds of our own studies on the Dutch waste sector and the Belgian trade in e-waste. We also pay attention to how these three criminological perspectives are reflected in reports and recommendations on waste crime by NGOs and international governmental organizations. For each of the three perspectives, we discuss a couple of prominent cases of waste crime that reflect the framing of the nature and the causes of the theoretical perspectives.

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Why Do Some Oil-Producing Countries Succeed in Democracy While Others Fail?

Cited by 37 publications

References 39 publications

Is There a Fiscal Resource Curse? Resource Rents, Fiscal Capacity and Political Institutions

Is There a Fiscal Resource Curse? Resource Rents, Fiscal Capacity and Political Institutions

Is there a fiscal resource curse? Resource rents, fiscal capacity, and political institutions in developing economies

Waste crime from three criminological perspectives

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