Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb

Sagan, Scott D.

doi:10.1162/isec.21.3.54

Cited by 157 publications

(88 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Previous research (e.g. Scott Sagan 1996Solingen 1994Solingen , 1998Solingen , 2007Singh and Way 2004;Jo and Gartzke 2007;Paul 2000) suggests that economic development, openness to the international economy, economic liberalization, membership in the NPT, and threat environment shape a state's demand for nuclear weapons. It is likely, therefore, that these variables also shape a recipient's demand for sensitive nuclear assistance.…”

Section: To Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance

Kroenig

2009

Am Polit Sci Rev

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Why do states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapon states, contributing to the international spread of nuclear weapons? Using a new dataset on sensitive nuclear transfers, this paper analyzes the determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance. I first describe a simple logic of the differential effects of nuclear proliferation, which I use to generate hypotheses about the conditions under which states provide sensitive nuclear assistance. I then show that the strategic characteristics of the potential nuclear suppliers are the most important determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance. Explanations that emphasize the importance of economic motivations do not find support in the data. This paper presents a new approach to the study of the spread of nuclear weapons, focusing on the supply side of nuclear proliferation.

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Section: To Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance

Kroenig

2009

Am Polit Sci Rev

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“…After considering alternative versions of such cognitive maps, we constructed more nearly hierarchical cognitive models such as that in Figure 5, which framed the thinking in terms of natural objectives for the despotic leadership of North Korea. This structure had much in common with later work described in an excellent study of proliferation issues by Stanford University's Scott Sagan (Sagan, 1996). The primary observation to make is that "proliferation" or "nonproliferation" is not the point when framed in this cognitive model.…”

Section: Cognitive Modeling When One Lacks Personal Detailmentioning

confidence: 89%

Simple Culture-Informed Models of the Adversary

Davis¹

2016

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“…I think, of these reasons, three main factors drive the DPRK to pursue nuclear weapons: threat perceptions, domestic political structures and strategic considerations. Firstly, when a state perceives threat, nuclear weapons can form nuclear deterrence to potential and actual adversary even if its conventional military capabilities are not sufficient [4] . North Korea feels great and real threat from South Korea and its allies and the deployment of THAAD and their endless military exercises are good examples in case.…”

Section: Reasons For North Korea To Acquire Nuclear Weaponsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Threat of the North Korean Nuclear Program and the Way to Manage It

Xiao-yu¹

2018

Proceedings of the 2017 2nd International Seminar on Education Innovation and Economic Management (SEIEM 2017)

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Abstract-The North Korean nuclear program has long been the focus of the international society and all the parties concerned have been trying every possible means to stop it but in vain. To help people have a clear picture of the North Korean nuclear program and effectively reduce its potential threat, the author first explains reasons for North Korean pursuit for nuclear program and then evaluates the possible effects-direct threat to regional security, indirect support to other nuclear aspirants and open defiance to NPT. Finally, she puts that pure economic sanctions or political disintegration can never work, and that truly felt responsibility from the U.S-led alliance for the security of China and ordinary citizens of North Korea as well as China's active involvement in the sanctions can really count.

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Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb

Cited by 157 publications

References 22 publications

Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance

Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance

Simple Culture-Informed Models of the Adversary

The Threat of the North Korean Nuclear Program and the Way to Manage It

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