Why Don't Partisans Sanction Electoral Malpractice?

Abstract

Partisans rarely punish their party at the polls for violating democratic norms or cheating in elections. However, we know little about the underlying reasons. I examine why partisans rarely sanction in-party malpractice. Using pre-registered survey experiments in Denmark and Mexico, I examine the different steps in how partisans adjust their views in response to revelations of electoral malpractice and distinguish between two substantively different explanations. Do pervasive biases prevent partisans from viewing in-party malpractice as illegitimate? Or, do partisans accurately update their views when learning about malpractice but refrain from voting against their party? The analysis demonstrates that partisans do not apply double standards when evaluating malpractice. However, although partisans punish in-party malpractice, they hold opposing parties in such low esteem that even revelations of malpractice do not change their minds. These findings contribute to our understanding of how partisans think about electoral malpractice and political malfeasance more broadly.

Suspicious Minds: Unexpected Election Outcomes, Perceived Electoral Integrity and Satisfaction With Democracy in American Presidential Elections

“…Worryingly, allegations and actual revelations of electoral fraud are met with a great deal of partiality. One study among Danish and Mexican voters showed that, although partisans strongly disapproved foul play from their own party (as much as they did for other parties), revelations of electoral malpractice were usually not enough to cause voters to defect from their party ( Aarslew 2022 ). In other words, strong partisans were more supportive of an in-party government that engaged in election meddling than they were of an out-party government that won fair and square.…”

Young People Punish Undemocratic Behaviour Less Than Older People

“…In Appendix D, I conduct an additional analysis, where I draw on available data from eight related published studies (Aarslew 2023; Carey et al 2022; Graham and Svolik 2020; Krishnarajan 2023; Lewandowsky and Jankowski 2023; Mares and Visconti 2020; Reuter and Szakonyi 2021; Saikkonen and Christensen 2022), which, among other sources, include data from YouGov, pre-pandemic Lucid, and the Russian Election Study. This additional analysis shows that the results are robust to using survey platforms other than Lucid and MTurk, as the interaction between undemocratic behaviour and age – compared with the original pooled effects shown in Fig.…”

Citizens as a Democratic Safeguard? The Sequence of Sanctioning Elite Attacks on Democracy

“…Closely related, while the bulk of research has focused on incumbent misconduct (Aarslew 2022;Simonovits, McCoy, and Littvay, Forthcoming) or neglected government status at all (Saikkonen and Christensen 2022;Wunsch, Jacob, and Derksen 2022;Graham and Svolik 2020), this paper jointly studies citizens' reactions to winning and losing (or incumbent and opposition) politicians. Specifically, I focus on an incumbent seizing control over an electoral commission and an opposition politician not conceding defeat.…”