Why Is Aristotle’s Virtue of Character a Mean? Taking Aristotle at His Word (<i>NE</i>ii 6)

Brown, Lesley

doi:10.1017/cco9781139022484.004

Cited by 68 publications

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“… Both Brown () and Vasiliou () argue, as I will, that Aristotle does not endorse a “priority of virtue” view according to which the goodness of virtuous actions is explained by reference to virtue of character. Brown suggests that it might be the responses of the virtuous agent, rather than virtue of character, that is prior to and explanatory of virtuous actions.…”

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confidence: 94%

“… I discuss this passage, and the significance of the distinction between acting virtuously and virtuous actions in more detail in Hirji (forthcoming). See also Brown (), esp. p. 78‐79 on the interpretation of this passage and its relevance for determining whether Aristotle subscribes to the priority of virtue thesis we find in neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics.…”

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confidence: 99%

“… Aristotle describes virtue of character as a mean state (NE 2.6 1106a14‐15) and insists that virtue finds and chooses what is the mean in both feelings and actions (1106b16‐18, 1107a2‐6). For discussion of the doctrine of the mean, see for example Brown (, ), Curzer (), Hardie (), Leighton (). …”

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What's Aristotelian about neo‐Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?

Hirji

2018

Philos Phenomenol Research

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It is commonly assumed that Aristotle's ethical theory shares deep structural similarities with neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. I argue that this assumption is a mistake, and that Aristotle's ethical theory is both importantly distinct from the theories his work has inspired, and independently compelling. I take neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics to be characterized by two central commitments: (i) virtues of character are defined as traits that reliably promote an agent's own flourishing, and (ii) virtuous actions are defined as the sorts of actions a virtuous agent reliably performs under the relevant circumstances. I argue that neither of these commitments are features of Aristotle's own view, and I sketch an alternative explanation for the relationship between virtue and happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics. Although, on the interpretation I defend, we do not find in Aristotle a distinctive normative theory alongside deontology and consequentialism, what we do find is a way of thinking about how prudential and moral reasons can come to be aligned through a certain conception of practical agency.

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confidence: 94%

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confidence: 99%