Why is Ethics First Philosophy? Levinas in Phenomenological Context

Abstract

This paper explores, from a phenomenological perspective, the conditions necessary for the possession of intentional content, i.e., for being intentionally directed toward the world. It argues that Levinas's concept of ethics as first philosophy makes an important contribution to this task. Intentional directedness, as understood here, is normatively structured. Levinas's ‘ethics’ can be understood as a phenomenological account of how our experience of the other subject as another subject takes place in the recognition of the normative force of a command. This supplies a condition that—as the paper shows by examining Husserl and Sartre on how our experience of the Other constitutes an ‘objective’ world—earlier phenomenologists have misunderstood, because they have treated ethical experience as ‘founded’ on a prior theory of representation (‘ontology’ in Levinas's language). Ethics is first philosophy because it is only by acknowledging the command in the ‘face’ of the Other that we can account for the sensitivity to the normative distinctions that structure intentional content. Throughout, the paper shows how Levinas's analyses, in Totality and Infinity, draw upon and develop the analyses of Husserl and Sartre.

Heterotopia as an Environmental and Political Concept: The Case of Hannah Arendt's Philosophy

“…It is to this challenge that the aforementioned concept of the world responds. Drawing on the phenomenological tradition (Crowell 2012), Arendt uses this category to speak about objectivity as the quality that requires confrontation with other subjectivities. A subject can perceive something as an object -that which is distinguished from her and 'stand[s] against', her (Arendt 1998: 137) 8 -only provided that she is aware that there are other subjects whose perceptions of that thing object to her own (Arendt 1998: 57).…”

Levinas's Philosophy of Perception

“…Emmanuel Levinas's philosophy of perception has yet to be fully appreciated, let alone understood. Stepping back a little, hardly anyone has given Levinas much consideration as a philosopher of mind at all, although there has been some discussion of his views about the phenomenology of interpersonal relations and its bearing on contemporary accounts of the nature of our understanding and knowledge of other minds (Overgaard ; Krueger ; Gallagher ; Crowell ). Admittedly, it is possible that if his work has gone largely unnoticed in this regard, that is because it is just not relevant.…”

Phenomenology Park: The Landscape of Husserlian Phenomenology

“…Jack Reynolds (2013), Janet Donohoe (2004), and James Hart (1992Hart ( , 2009 have developed ethical views in relation to Husserl's philosophy. Sophie Loidolt (2012Loidolt ( , 2014Loidolt ( , 2017Loidolt ( , 2018Loidolt ( , 2021 has developed ideas from both Husserl and Hannah Arendt, while Steven Crowell (2013Crowell ( , 2015, William Smith (2011b), andIrene McMullin (2018) have addressed the question of moral normativity from a Heideggerian perspective.…”