Why logical pluralism?

Caret, Colin R.

doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02132-w

Cited by 14 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 40 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…So, what other logics would count as a witness of (IP-2)? A natural suggestion points to intuitionistic logic, hereafter L I , ⇒ I ; this system is favoured by various pluralistic proposals [see, e.g., Beall and Restall, 2006;Caret, 2021;Carnielli and Rodrigues, 2019a;Kouri Kissel, 2018]. Suppose that intuitionistic logic has an adequate interpretation; for example, it captures demonstrability-preserving arguments.…”

Section: Interpretational Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logical Pluralism and Interpretations of Logical Systems

Tajer¹,

Fiore

2022

LLP

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Logical pluralism is a general idea that there is more than one correct logic. Carnielli and Rodrigues [2019a] defend an epistemic interpretation of the paraconsistent logic N4, according to which an argument is valid in this logic just in case it necessarily preserves evidence. The authors appeal to this epistemic interpretation to briefly motivate a kind of logical pluralism: “different accounts of logical consequence may preserve different properties of propositions”. The aim of this paper is to study the prospect of a logical pluralism based on different interpretations of logical systems. First, we give our analysis of what it means to interpret a logic – and make some hopefully useful distinctions along the way. Second, we present what we call an interpretational logical pluralism: there is more than one correct logic and a logic is correct only if it has some adequate interpretation. We consider four variants of this idea, bring up some possible objections, and try to find plausible solutions on behalf of the pluralist. We will argue that interpretations of logical systems provide a promising – albeit not unproblematic – route to logical pluralism.

show abstract

Section: Interpretational Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logical Pluralism and Interpretations of Logical Systems

Tajer¹,

Fiore

2022

LLP

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The meta-logic, in turn, influences which logics are correct. Contextualised pluralism embraces these facts and thereby follows Caret's (2019) 'honest naturalism'. Contextualism is not unheard-of in the pluralist camp: Hjortland (2013), Shapiro (2014) and Caret (2017) suggest contextualism to understand 'valid' across object-logics.…”

Section: Contextualisation Of Correct Logicmentioning

confidence: 99%

Should pluralists be pluralists about pluralism?

Paßmann

2021

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

How many correct logics are there? Monists endorse that there is one, pluralists argue for many, and nihilists claim that there are none. Reasoning about these views requires a logic. That is the meta-logic. It turns out that there are some meta-logical challenges specifically for the pluralists. I will argue that these depend on an implicitly assumed absoluteness of correct logic. Pluralists can solve the challenges by giving up on this absoluteness and instead adopt contextualism about correct logic. This contextualism is naturalistically appealing.

show abstract

“…Future information cannot invalidate previous valid conclusions. Caret (2019) defined that logical theory has occupied a true bond with Alethic in terms of consistency in its belief, which is valid and rational. Alethic logic continues with each additional true premise the inferences drawn from the propositions are valid and consistent.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Truth Logic of Modalities Consistent and Incompatible: A Computational Program and Experimental Studies among College Students

Waheed,

Wang,

Waheed

et al. 2023

J. Tert. Educ. Learn.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

College students give true judgment routinely, logicians can infer modal inferences, i.e., inferences that concern three alethic modalities; necessary (⸧), possible (◊), and impossible (⟢) from the premises that are logically consistent and incompatible. To achieve the desired results, logicians have intermingled alethic modalities with logical consistency and incompatibility, i.e., necessary consistent, impossible incompatible, possible consistent, or possible incompatible, and write them in classical modal logic as ⸧C (necessary consistent), ◊C (possible consistent) or ◊I (possibly incompatible) and ⟢I (impossible incompatible). M paradigm [Modality, Mental logic theory (MLT), and Mental model theory (MMT)] have been built to enlighten this truth logic. The basic idea of this study is to examine the theory; how do students judge whether two or more different propositions are possible? and, whether their judgment is true. Truth logic is used to construct some principles that help to justify the above theory. First, inferences have either ◊C/ ◊I or ⸧C but assertions are consistent. Second, each ◊C/ ◊I inference and premise is evaluated for both single and double model assertions, and they have consistency (i.e., ⸧C/◊C) and incompatibility (i.e., ◊I or ⟢I). As logicians have predicted, students mostly endorse inferences as ◊C/ ◊I rather than ⸧C and the ⟢I rate is higher in multi-model assertions. Syllogistic logical reasoning with conditionals (if, then...), conjunctions (and), disjunctions (or), and quantifiers “all” and “some” have been used in the M paradigm to evaluate predictions. Moreover, a computational program and experimental studies have strongly supported the all given principles and predictions.

show abstract

Why logical pluralism?

Cited by 14 publications

References 40 publications

Logical Pluralism and Interpretations of Logical Systems

Logical Pluralism and Interpretations of Logical Systems

Should pluralists be pluralists about pluralism?

Truth Logic of Modalities Consistent and Incompatible: A Computational Program and Experimental Studies among College Students

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About