Why not be a desertist?

Brouwer, H. A.; Mulligan, Thomas

doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1125-4

Cited by 19 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…Our theory takes justice to be a distribution according to desert*, where we take desert* to be anything that justifies outcome inequality (in a procedure-independent sense). Desert* could refer to needs (Wiggins 1987;Herlitz and Horan 2016), responsibility (Arneson 1989;Roemer 1993), or, indeed, desert (Feldman 2016Brouwer and Mulligan 2019), depending on what your favourite view of justice happens to be. FEC is, in fact, compatible with the justification of inequalities being context-dependent (Miller 1999).…”

Section: Building Up To Fair Equality Of Chancesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fair equality of chances for prediction-based decisions

Loi,

Herlitz,

Heidari

2023

Economics and Philosophy

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This article presents a fairness principle for evaluating decision-making based on predictions: a decision rule is unfair when the individuals directly impacted by the decisions who are equal with respect to the features that justify inequalities in outcomes do not have the same statistical prospects of being benefited or harmed by them, irrespective of their socially salient morally arbitrary traits. The principle can be used to evaluate prediction-based decision-making from the point of view of a wide range of antecedently specified substantive views about justice in outcome distributions.

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Section: Building Up To Fair Equality Of Chancesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fair equality of chances for prediction-based decisions

Loi,

Herlitz,

Heidari

2023

Economics and Philosophy

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“…5 Another more serious issue is that causal reasoning will not tell, by itself, what causes should count. For instance, some theories of justice consider that burdens and benefits should be distributed according to desert [7]. A recommendation might be costly for a person, but she might deserve to be in that position.…”

Section: Fairnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

From Explanation to Recommendation: Ethical Standards for Algorithmic Recourse

Sullivan,

Verreault-Julien

2022

Preprint

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People are increasingly subject to algorithmic decisions, and it is generally agreed that end-users should be provided an explanation or rationale for these decisions. There are different purposes that explanations can have, such as increasing user trust in the system or allowing users to contest the decision. One specific purpose that is gaining more traction is algorithmic recourse. We first propose that recourse should be viewed as a recommendation problem, not an explanation problem. Then, we argue that the capability approach provides plausible and fruitful ethical standards for recourse. We illustrate by considering the case of diversity constraints on algorithmic recourse. Finally, we discuss the significance and implications of adopting the capability approach for algorithmic recourse research.

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“…In this article, we will use "imprudent" and "imprudence" in this sense.4 Although there are obvious differences between the possible health costs to prudent patients and the possible economic costs to prudent tax payers (or insurance premium payers), we consider the ethical implications of these two "costs" to be similar enough for our present purposes. Therefore, we will not discern between the two types of "cost" in the following analysis.5 For more on desertism, and how this theory differs from luck egalitarianism, seeBrouwer and Mulligan (2019). Here it may suffice to point out that for LEHC, unlike for desertism, imprudence is a function of opportunity cost.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 5 For more on desertism, and how this theory differs from luck egalitarianism, see Brouwer and Mulligan ( 2019 ). Here it may suffice to point out that for LEHC, unlike for desertism, imprudence is a function of opportunity cost.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Better in theory than in practise? Challenges when applying the luck egalitarian ethos in health care policy

Björk

Helgesson

Juth

2020

Med Health Care and Philos

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Luck egalitarianism, a theory of distributive justice, holds that inequalities which arise due to individuals’ imprudent choices must not, as a matter of justice, be neutralized. This article deals with the possible application of luck egalitarianism to the area of health care. It seeks to investigate whether the ethos of luck egalitarianism can be operationalized to the point of informing health care policy without straying from its own ideals. In the transition from theory to practise, luck egalitarianism encounters several difficulties. We argue that the charge of moral arbitrariness can, at least in part, be countered by our provided definition of “imprudent actions” in the health area. We discuss the choice for luck egalitarianism in health care between ex ante and ex post policy approaches, and show how both approaches are flawed by luck egalitarianism’s own standards. We also examine the problem of threshold setting when luck egalitarianism is set to practise in health care. We argue that wherever policy thresholds are set, luck egalitarianism in health care risks pampering the imprudent, abandoning the prudent or, at worst, both. Furthermore, we claim that moves to mitigate these risks in turn diminish the normative importance of the ethos of luck egalitarianism to policy. All in all, our conclusion is that luck egalitarianism cannot be consistently applied as a convincing and relevant normative principle in health care policy.

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Why not be a desertist?

Cited by 19 publications

References 55 publications

Fair equality of chances for prediction-based decisions

Fair equality of chances for prediction-based decisions

From Explanation to Recommendation: Ethical Standards for Algorithmic Recourse

Better in theory than in practise? Challenges when applying the luck egalitarian ethos in health care policy

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