Why Populism? How Parties Shape the Electoral Fortune of Populists

Abstract

Much of the literature on populism restricts itself to specific regional contexts. Due to this approach, theories of populism have difficulty explaining cross-regional similarities or differences (such as the prevalence of exclusive populist parties in Europe but inclusive parties in Latin America). Using cross-regional data and exploratory case studies from multiple regions, we provide evidence that the prevalence of populism in a given party system is a function of both party institutionalization and electoral institutions. The combination of these factors we term institutional hostility. In laying out our theory we identify three ways in which populist parties enter party systems and contest elections: populist entry, populist targeting and adaptation, and populist capture.

Parties, Civil Society, and the Deterrence of Democratic Defection

“…3 Party institutionalization is highlighted as a means for channeling the interests of social groups, promoting actors and attitudes supportive of democracy, and facilitating credible commitments (e.g., Mainwaring and Torcal 2006;Ufen 2008;Lewis 2006). Weak or collapsing democratic political parties open the door to anti-system outsiders who threaten democratic institutions (Linz 1994;Samuels and Shugart 2010;Carreras 2012;Mainwaring 2018;Self and Hicken 2018). Weak parties make it harder to hold politicians collectively accountable (Moser and Scheiner 2012;Kitschelt et al 2010), and create greater uncertainty about actors' preferences, time horizons, and commitment to democracy (Lupu and Riedl 2013;Levitsky 2018;Flores-Macías 2018;Hicken 2016).…”