Why the Epistemic Objection Against Using Sentience as Criterion of Moral Status is Flawed

Dung, Leonard

doi:10.1007/s11948-022-00408-y

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…We can consider in this regard the epistemic objection that "derives from our profound uncertainty about sentience … we cannot use sentience as a criterion to ascribe moral status in practice because we won't know in the foreseeable future which animals and AI systems are sentient." 57 So, the proposal is to utilize another criterion, different from sentience. For example, the possession of desires or psychological equivalence to moral patiency has been proposed.…”

Section: Introduction: Three Sets Of Reasons For Moral Concernmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human Brain Organoids: Why There Can Be Moral Concerns If They Grow Up in the Lab and Are Transplanted or Destroyed

Lavazza

Reichlin

2023

Camb Q Healthc Ethics

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Human brain organoids (HBOs) are three-dimensional biological entities grown in the laboratory in order to recapitulate the structure and functions of the adult human brain. They can be taken to be novel living entities for their specific features and uses. As a contribution to the ongoing discussion on the use of HBOs, the authors identify three sets of reasons for moral concern. The first set of reasons regards the potential emergence of sentience/consciousness in HBOs that would endow them with a moral status whose perimeter should be established. The second set of moral concerns has to do with an analogy with artificial womb technology. The technical realization of processes that are typically connected to the physiology of the human body can create a manipulatory and instrumental attitude that can undermine the protection of what is human. The third set concerns the new frontiers of biocomputing and the creation of chimeras. As far as the new frontier of organoid intelligence is concerned, it is the close relationship of humans with new interfaces having biological components capable of mimicking memory and cognition that raises ethical issues. As far as chimeras are concerned, it is the humanization of nonhuman animals that is worthy of close moral scrutiny. A detailed description of these ethical issues is provided to contribute to the construction of a regulative framework that can guide decisions when considering research in the field of HBOs.

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Section: Introduction: Three Sets Of Reasons For Moral Concernmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human Brain Organoids: Why There Can Be Moral Concerns If They Grow Up in the Lab and Are Transplanted or Destroyed

Lavazza

Reichlin

2023

Camb Q Healthc Ethics

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“…That is, it is conscious iff it has subjective experience. Arguably, whether a being has conscious (affective) experience determines whether it has moral status (Dung, 2022b;Jaworska & Tannenbaum, 2021;Shevlin, 2020b).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tests of Animal Consciousness are Tests of Machine Consciousness

Dung

2023

Erkenn

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If a machine attains consciousness, how could we find out? In this paper, I make three related claims regarding positive tests of machine consciousness. All three claims center on the idea that an AI can be constructed “ad hoc”, that is, with the purpose of satisfying a particular test of consciousness while clearly not being conscious. First, a proposed test of machine consciousness can be legitimate, even if AI can be constructed ad hoc specifically to pass this test. This is underscored by the observation that many, if not all, putative tests of machine consciousness can be passed by non-conscious machines via ad hoc means. Second, we can identify ad hoc AI by taking inspiration from the notion of an ad hoc hypothesis in philosophy of science. Third, given the first and the second claim, the most reliable tests of animal consciousness turn out to be valid and useful positive tests of machine consciousness as well. If a non-ad hoc AI exhibits clusters of cognitive capacities facilitated by consciousness in humans which can be selectively switched off by masking and if it reproduces human behavior in suitably designed double dissociation tasks, we should treat the AI as conscious.

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“…Both kinds of pain may be similarly bad instrumentally, for instance if they cause a trauma, but in terms of their contribution to intrinsic value, there is a sharp contrast.5 Other objections to sentientism are based on the illusionist theory of consciousness(Kammerer 2019) or the epistemic inaccessibility of sentience(Danaher 2020;Gunkel 2019;Shevlin 2020). For a response to the former argument, seeDung (2022a), and to the latter, seeDung (2022b).…”

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confidence: 99%

Preserving the Normative Significance of Sentience

Dung

2024

Journal of Consciousness Studies

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According to an orthodox view, the capacity for conscious experience (sentience) is relevant to the distribution of moral status and value. However, physicalism about consciousness might threaten the normative relevance of sentience. According to the indeterminacy argument, sentience is metaphysically indeterminate while indeterminacy of sentience is incompatible with its normative relevance. According to the introspective argument (by François Kammerer), the unreliability of our conscious introspection undercuts the justification for belief in the normative relevance of consciousness. I defend the normative relevance of sentience against these objections. First, I demonstrate that physicalists only have to concede a limited amount of indeterminacy of sentience. This moderate indeterminacy is in harmony with the role of sentience in determining moral status. Second, I argue that physicalism gives us no reason to expect that introspection is unreliable with respect to the normative relevance of consciousness.

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Why the Epistemic Objection Against Using Sentience as Criterion of Moral Status is Flawed

Cited by 8 publications

References 39 publications

Human Brain Organoids: Why There Can Be Moral Concerns If They Grow Up in the Lab and Are Transplanted or Destroyed

Human Brain Organoids: Why There Can Be Moral Concerns If They Grow Up in the Lab and Are Transplanted or Destroyed

Tests of Animal Consciousness are Tests of Machine Consciousness

Preserving the Normative Significance of Sentience

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