Why the Problem of Evil Might not be a Problem after all in African Philosophy of Religion

Abstract

For decades, the problem of evil has occupied a centre stage in the Western philosophical discourse of the existence of God. The problem centres on the unlikelihood to reconcile the existence of an absolute and morally perfect God with the evidence of evil in the universe. This is the evidential problem of evil that has been a source of dispute among theists, atheists, agnostics, and sceptics. There seems to be no end to this dispute, making the problem of evil a perennial one in Western Philosophy of Religion. In this essay, I will contribute to this discourse from an African perspective. This essay, therefore, explores the evidential problem of evil within the African philosophy of religion. I argue that it is unlikely for the evidential problem of evil to be a problem in African philosophy of religion. I invoke an Ejima-based argument to support this claim. I conceptualize the Igbo word Ejima to metaphysically mean the inevitable coexistence of two opposite variables as complements to argue that God could be both good and evil within the African Traditional Religion, which explains why good and evil exist in the universe.

African Approaches to God, Death and the Problem of Evil: Some Anthropological lessons towards an Intercultural Philosophy of Religion

“…of the lesser deities (BEWAJI 1998), or in both power and knowledge as he is neither all-powerful nor wholly good (FAYEMI 2012). 8 Since this is the case, God is incapable of stopping the evil in the world and, in fact, capable of evil since a deity limited in knowledge can make mistakes that cause harm (AGADA 2022). For Fayemi, God is a powerful being indeed, but as a co-creator he is limited when he argues that "Olodumare…is seen by the Yoruba as the ultimate cause of all visible processes in the world.…”

Examining the logical argument of the problem of evil from an African perspective

“…The problem of evil is usually formulated in three main ways: the logical argument, which states that the existence of evil in this world is inconsistent with the existence of an omnibenevolent God (Mackie (1981)); the evidential argument, which states that the fact of evil in this world constitutes evidence that there exists no morally perfect God (Rowe (1979); Tooley and Plantinga (2008); AE Chimakonam (2022)); 2 and the theodicy, which attempts to offer a positive resolution to the problem of evil by allusion to the greater good or any morally sufficient reason to justify God's permission of evil in the world or reconcile the existence of evil with the idea of an omnibenevolent God (O'Leary (1996); Trakakis (2008)). We focus in this article on the logical argument.…”

“…1.In African philosophy of religion, AE Chimakonam (2022) was the first thinker to attempt what could be regarded as a negative resolution of the evidential variant of the problem. Attoe (2022a) is another thinker who attempts a negative resolution of the problem of evil.…”

Approches Africaines Sur Les Questions De Dieu, De La Mort Et Du Mal: Quelques Leçons Anthropologiques Vers Une Philosophie Interculturelle De La Religion

“…La raison en est que la plupart des sociétés africaines traditionnelles conçoivent Dieu comme si lointain que les divinités inférieures deviennent des intermédiaires dignes de révérence puisque ces divinités inférieures influencent directement la vie humaine par leur interaction avec Dieu (ACHEBE 1994). Si Dieu est un Deus absconditus, ou Dieu caché, et que les divinités inférieures le suppléent efficacement, il est raisonnable de penser que Dieu doit être limité, soit en puissance du fait qu'il est précédé par la matière préexistante (WIREDU 1998), soit en connaissance puisqu'il s'en remet à la sagesse des divinités inférieures (BEWAJI 1998), soit à la fois en puissance et en connaissance puisqu'il n'est ni tout-puissant ni entièrement bon (FAYEMI 2012) 8. Puisque c'est le cas, Dieu est incapable d'arrêter le mal dans le monde et, en fait, capable du mal puisqu'une divinité limitée dans la connaissance peut faire des erreurs qui causent du mal (AGADA 2022).…”

“…Pour une discussion plus critique sur cette transcendance et cette limitation de la notion de Dieu, voir Ada Agada (2022) 7. Voir par exemple,Sogolo (1993),Bewaji (1998),Wiredu (1998),Oladipo (2004),Balogun (2009), Fayemi (2012) 8. Cependant, des universitaires africains s'opposent à cette idée d'un Dieu reclus, voir par exempleBolaji (1962 ;1973),Mbiti (1969 ;1970) etGyekye (1995).…”