For decades, the problem of evil has occupied a centre stage in the Western philosophical discourse of the existence of God. The problem centres on the unlikelihood to reconcile the existence of an absolute and morally perfect God with the evidence of evil in the universe. This is the evidential problem of evil that has been a source of dispute among theists, atheists, agnostics, and sceptics. There seems to be no end to this dispute, making the problem of evil a perennial one in Western Philosophy of Religion. In this essay, I will contribute to this discourse from an African perspective. This essay, therefore, explores the evidential problem of evil within the African philosophy of religion. I argue that it is unlikely for the evidential problem of evil to be a problem in African philosophy of religion. I invoke an Ejima-based argument to support this claim. I conceptualize the Igbo word Ejima to metaphysically mean the inevitable coexistence of two opposite variables as complements to argue that God could be both good and evil within the African Traditional Religion, which explains why good and evil exist in the universe.

Since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, there has been an increase in religious conspiracy theories (henceforth RCTs) in Africa, ranging from outright denial, partial acceptance to spreading misinformation about the Coronavirus. This essay will argue that RCTs pose serious challenges to Covid-19 prevention by encouraging non-compliance to Covid-19 preventive measures and refusal to take Covid-19 vaccination. It will then formulate a personhood-based theory of right action. This new theory will be teased out of Ifeanyi Menkiti's account of the normative conception of personhood and deployed here as a veritable tool for overcoming the challenges posed by RCTs in the fight against the COVID-19 Pandemic in Africa.

We argue that the problem of evil, logically, stems from the unequal binary that characterizes the bivalent structure of Western discourses in the philosophy of religion. This structure pits God against the devil, but also the value of good against evil they are believed to represent. The difficulty is that those who subscribe to creationism, for example, hold that God as an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect entity created everything. Ironically, this must include evil or the devil himself. If one says He did not create evil, then one is faced with the challenge of explaining how evil emerged and how an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect God could continue to allow evil in the world. Our strategy would be to dilute the problem by dismantling logical bivalence. With an appropriate logic background like the African truth-glut three-valued system of Ezumezu as an explanatory mechanism, we will demonstrate that the problem of evil is resolvable, even if negatively. Using the principle of value-complementarity, we will argue that the notions of good and evil are not merely opposites but complementary. In this way, God, would be construed, especially from logical ideas inspired by the viewpoint of the African Traditional world-view, as ‘harmony-God’.

African Metaphysics, Groundwork for a New Kind of African Metaphysics: The Idea of Predeterministic Historicity, by reflecting on some of the philosophical issues that it provokes. Attoe contests some basic assumptions undergirding the philosophical approach to metaphysics within the African episteme in this book. His contestation leads him to a materialistic conception of reality in African metaphysics. While noting the original contribution of Attoe’s book, such as singular complementarism, and predeterministic historicity, I identify and discuss some issues in the book that deserve critical philosophical engagement.