Why the question of animal consciousness might not matter very much

Carruthers, Peter

doi:10.1080/09515080500085411

Cited by 32 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…In a highly cited article in philosophy, and one of the most influential papers on consciousness, Nagel (1974) wondered how the world must seem to a bat, who perceives the world in a way we cannot, using echolocation to perceive space. Views have ranged from those who believe that animals lack consciousness, especially higher order consciousness (Carruthers, 2005; Descartes, 1637/1994), to those who approach the question with an anthropocentrism perspective and view animals as little humans (Wynne, 2001, pp. 1–3).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Insights from the animal kingdom

Morwitz

2014

J Consum Psychol

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Just as we have learned a great deal in consumer psychology by focusing on understanding how different sub‐groups of humans think, this paper suggests that we can also learn from examining how different types of animals think. To that end, this manuscript offers a review of literature on topics in animal cognition that have also been investigated by consumer researchers. It first reviews research that has identified ways in which animals and humans are similar and then reviews research that has identified ways in which animals differ from humans, with a focus on ways in which some animals have been shown to outperform humans. The manuscript concludes with a discussion of opportunities for future research.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Insights from the animal kingdom

Morwitz

2014

J Consum Psychol

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“…Dretske (1995) and Tye (1995) consciousness in terms of world-directed or first-order intentional states: mental states such as perceptual experiences and bodily sensations are said to be conscious if they affect or are poised to affect one's belief-forming system. According to Carruthers (2005), if some form of first-order phenomenal consciousness is correct, then phenomenal consciousness will be widespread in the animal community. Since nonhuman animals often form beliefs about their environment based upon their perceptual states and bodily sensations, they are said to possess conscious perceptual states and experience bodily sensations under a FOR theory.…”

Section: What Is Consciousness?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Nonhuman Animals: Not Necessarily Saints or Sinners

Abbate

2013

BTS

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Higher-order thought theories maintain that consciousness involves the having of higher-order thoughts about mental states. In response to these theories of consciousness, an attempt is often made to illustrate that nonhuman animals possess said consciousness, overlooking a potential consequence: attributing higher-order thought to nonhuman animals might entail that they should be held morally accountable for their actions. I argue that moral responsibility requires more than higher-order thought: moral agency requires a specific higherorder thought which concerns a belief about the rightness or wrongness of affecting another's mental states. This "moral thought" about the rightness or wrongness is not yet demonstrated in even the most intelligent nonhuman animals, thus we should suspend our judgments about the "rightness" or "wrongness" of their actions while further questioning the recent insistence on developing an animal morality.

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“…In light of the swarm alternative, the usefulness of Carruthers' distinction between “weak” and “genuine” forms of mindreading and metacognition becomes questionable. Our overarching worry is that Carruthers' emphasis on a single faculty of metarepresentation, combined with his acknowledgment of the rich heritage of cognitive abilities shared between humans and animals, leaves the faculty almost epiphenomenal in human cognition (except, perhaps, for Machiavelli himself) – a position that Carruthers has previously been driven to adopt with respect to his account of phenomenal consciousness (Carruthers 2005; see also Shriver & Allen 2005). An alternative approach might be to tone down the deflationary invocation of first-order mechanisms, and focus instead on what creatures endowed with a swarm of weakly integrated mechanisms can do and learn.…”

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confidence: 99%

How “weak” mindreaders inherited the earth

et al. 2009

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That is true for humans, but it is equally true for animals, who must survive real-world challenges in environments in which errors lead to extinction. Brain evolution is not separate from the ability to observe and know the real world. On the contrary, when we are given truthful feedback about the world, humans and other animals become quite reality-based. There is no contradiction between constructivism and realism.How "weak" mindreaders inherited the earth Abstract: Carruthers argues that an integrated faculty of metarepresentation evolved for mindreading and was later exapted for metacognition. A more consistent application of his approach would regard metarepresentation in mindreading with the same skeptical rigor, concluding that the "faculty" may have been entirely exapted. Given this result, the usefulness of Carruthers' line-drawing exercise is called into question.Carruthers' recent work on metacognition in the target article (and in Carruthers 2008b) can be seen as an extended exercise in "debunking" metarepresentational interpretations of the results of experiments performed on nonhuman animals. The debunking approach operates by distinguishing "weak" metacognition, which depends only on first-order mechanisms, from "genuine" metacognition, which deploys metarepresentations. Shaun Gallagher (2001; 2004; with similar proposals explored by Hutto 2004; 2008) has been on a similar debunking mission with respect to metarepresentation in human mindreading abilities. Gallagher's position stands in an area of conceptual space unmapped by Carruthers' four models, which all presuppose that an integrated, metarepresentational faculty is the key to mindreading. Gallagher argues that most of our mindreading abilities can be reduced to a weakly integrated swarm of firstorder mechanisms, including face recognition and an ability to quickly map a facial expression to the appropriate emotional response, a perceptual bias towards organic versus inorganic movement, an automated capacity for imitation and proprioceptive sense of others' movements (through the mirror neuron system), an ability to track the gaze of others, and a bias towards triadic gaze (I-you-target). Notably, autistic individuals have deficiencies throughout the swarm.Someone pushing a "metarepresentation was wholly exapted" proposal might argue as follows: Interpretative propositional attitude ascription is a very recent development, likely an exaptation derived from linguistic abilities and general-purpose conceptlearning resources. Primate ancestors in social competition almost never needed to think about others not within perceptual range; in the absence of language which could be used to raise questions and consider plans concerning spatially or temporally absent individuals, there would have been little opportunity to demonstrate third-person mindreading prowess. After developing languages with metarepresentational resources, our ancestors' endowment with the swarm would have left them well placed to acquire metarepresentational mindreading and m...

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Why the question of animal consciousness might not matter very much

Cited by 32 publications

References 29 publications

Insights from the animal kingdom

Insights from the animal kingdom

Nonhuman Animals: Not Necessarily Saints or Sinners

How “weak” mindreaders inherited the earth

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