Why worry about theory‐dependence? Circularity, minimal empiricality and reliability

Adam, Matthias

doi:10.1080/0269859042000296486

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…However, later on, the question of how to obtain data turned out to be controversial. Several problem points were identified, one of which was theory-ladenness (for more details, see: Adam, 2004;Franklin et al, 1989). This formidable argument of philosophical theory is similar to the assertion that wherever we lose the keys, we will look for them under the lantern, because it is lighter there.…”

Section: Are the Empirical Data Pure Or Theory-laden?mentioning

confidence: 96%

The Role of an Implicit Assumption of Causality in the Methodology of Empirical Research

Storozhuk¹

2018

OJPP

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The purpose of the article is to point out the causal ladenness of empirical data in the social sciences. This is a kind of theory ladenness, representing implicit assumptions about the deterministic nature of political processes. The nonlinear and chaotic nature of social phenomena requires the collection of data not only about the current state of the system, but also about the evolution of the system. Using an example, we illustrate that the conclusions made on the basis of information about the final state can be very different from the conclusions made on the basis of monitoring the dynamics of the system. Low-importance factors can have big consequences in a chaotic case and, vice versa, there takes place fading of causality: considerable efforts can lead to more than modest results. For the successful management of political life, it is important to be able to identify the impacts that lead to great consequences.

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Section: Are the Empirical Data Pure Or Theory-laden?mentioning

confidence: 96%

The Role of an Implicit Assumption of Causality in the Methodology of Empirical Research

Storozhuk¹

2018

OJPP

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“…In this paper, the term 'theory' implies a fusion of ideation and practice (a kind of habitus), and this dependence affects both the analyst and the people being analysed. While there is some controversy around this position (Brown 1995;Sankey 1999;Adam 2004;Azzouni 2004), it seems indisputable that theories and practices help people to observe in certain ways and perceive certain events while hindering observation in other directions. Additionally, humans tend to suffer from confirmation bias (Nickerson 1998) which leads to the selection of confirmatory evidence and reinforces their theories.…”

Section: ) (Dis)informational Problems Of Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Psycho-social disruption, information disorder, and the politics of wind farming

Marshall

2018

Energy Research & Social Science

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“…But current evolutionary approaches to the human mind frequently appeal to observations that are not dependent on evolutionary theory itself – of course, they are dependent on other theories, but crucially, they do not depend on the specific evolutionary hypotheses they set out to test. Such observations, which are neutral with respect to the theory that is being tested, are denoted with O* (a term borrowed from Adam (2004)). Over the past decades, evolutionary psychologists 8 have used findings from neuroscience and cognitive, comparative and developmental psychology to test evolutionary hypotheses (see, e.g., Dunbar and Barrett 2007).…”

Section: Responses To the Circularity Chargementioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification

Cruz¹,

Boudry²,

Smedt³

et al. 2011

Dialectica

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What are the consequences of evolutionary theory for the epistemic standing of our beliefs? Evolutionary considerations can be used to either justify or debunk a variety of beliefs. This paper argues that evolutionary approaches to human cognition must at least allow for approximately reliable cognitive capacities. Approaches that portray human cognition as so deeply biased and deficient that no knowledge is possible are internally incoherent and self‐defeating. As evolutionary theory offers the current best hope for a naturalistic epistemology, evolutionary approaches to epistemic justification seem to be committed to the view that our sensory systems and belief‐formation processes are at least approximately accurate. However, for that reason they are vulnerable to the charge of circularity, and their success seems to be limited to commonsense beliefs. This paper offers an extension of evolutionary arguments by considering the use of external media in human cognitive processes: we suggest that the way humans supplement their evolved cognitive capacities with external tools may provide an effective way to increase the reliability of their beliefs and to counter evolved cognitive biases.

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Why worry about theory‐dependence? Circularity, minimal empiricality and reliability

Cited by 9 publications

References 5 publications

The Role of an Implicit Assumption of Causality in the Methodology of Empirical Research

The Role of an Implicit Assumption of Causality in the Methodology of Empirical Research

Psycho-social disruption, information disorder, and the politics of wind farming

Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification

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