„Wie ein Bogenstrich, der aus zwei Saiten eine Stimme zieht“. Eine dialogische Philosophie der Liebe

Love between couples living with Alzheimer's disease: narratives of spouse care-givers

“…It is constitutively shared … Love is not reducible to individual emotions or actions. Rather it is intertwining of two lives.’ In such an approach, love develops through cultivating a new identity, termed We (Buber 1958; Krebs 2011, 2014, 2015; Nozick 1989; Scheler 1954; Sherman 1987, 1993). According to Sherman, the We form is a way of being in which the partners are attuned to each other not merely out of respect or mere co-operation, but by expanding their personal boundaries to create a sense of union (Sherman 1993).…”

Are Lovers Ever One? Reconstructing the Union Theory of Love

“…According to this argumentative strategy, two persons, even in a love relationship, would always remain two organisms that can reside in or occupy different places, and both persons would still be aware of themselves as such and would not take themselves for the other person in each case; while they might perhaps effectively perceive things simultaneously, their perception would still function separately (cf. Krebs 2015 , 49; Soble 1997 , 69). Similar objections draw attention to the problematic consequences from a logical point of view: two persons, as it has been alleged, could no longer interact with each other insofar as they are actually one .…”

“… 1 For a defense of a theory of love as “concern” or “care,” see Frankfurt ( 2004 ); for a theory of love in terms of valuing, see Velleman ( 1999 ); and for the dialogue model, see Krebs ( 2015 ). – I should like to thank an anonymous reviewer, Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, Susanne Schmetkamp, and Dieter Schönecker for making some very valuable observations and objections, and Nicholas Walker for translating the text into English (with the exception of Hegel, all German sources are translated into English by N.W.).…”

“… 21 See, for example, Soble ( 1997 , 72, footnote); Krebs also points out the danger of a “standstill” if union is conceived in this manner (Krebs 2015 , 50). …”

“… 22 See, for example, Krebs ( 2015 , 50), Helm ( 2005 ), and Singer ( 1994 , 30, 135–139). Friedman points out that the relinquishment of autonomy can take place in an unequal manner ( 1998 , 169–172), whereas a temporary loss of autonomy can mean a long-term gain in autonomy ( 1998 , 176).…”