Wie transparent ist die Europäische Zentralbank? Eine international vergleichende Betrachtung vor dem Hintergrund der weitreichenden Neuerungen zum Januar 2015

Heidebrecht, Sebastian

doi:10.5771/1430-6387-2015-4-501

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…As the ECB's responsibilities widened in response to the Eurozone crisis, so did the central bank's attempts to improve the perception of its democratic accountability (Heidebrecht 2015). This manifested itself in a 'strategic partnership' between the ECB and the ECON Committee (Torres 2013), with exchanges becoming reflective of a 'more emancipated' accountability relationship between the two institutions and with Trichet's successor Mario Draghi displaying an increased 'willing [ness] to answer even hypothetical questions' by MEPs, at least compared to his predecessors (Collignon & Diessner 2016: 1305; see also Diessner 2023).…”

Section: -2019: Ecb-ep Communication As a One-and-a-half-way Street O...mentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Monetary Dialogue between the European Central Bank and the European Parliament: From monetary monologue to dialogue—and beyond?

Diessner

2023

Preprint

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This essay traces the evolution of the communication between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Parliament (EP) over the past 25 years of Monetary Dialogues between the two supranational institutions. The essay begins with a reflection on the political problem of central bank communication. It then sketches out three distinct phases of ECB-EP relations over time. The main contention is that ECB communication with the EP has started, and should continue, to move from a one-way street to a multi-way street, in the interest of further improving the democratic credentials of EMU.

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Section: -2019: Ecb-ep Communication As a One-and-a-half-way Street O...mentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Monetary Dialogue between the European Central Bank and the European Parliament: From monetary monologue to dialogue—and beyond?

Diessner

2023

Preprint

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“…In response to these growing threats to its democratic legitimacy, the ECB has ramped up its communications strategy, including towards the general public (Lokdam 2020;Ehrmann & Wabitsch 2021;Gardt et al 2021;de Haan [this volume]). It has started to publish minutes (or "accounts") of its monetary policy meetings (Heidebrecht 2015) and has reacted to calls for more transparency in its asset-purchasing programmes. Moreover, the central bank has launched a series of "ECB Listens" events, starting with civil society organisations in 2019, which fed into its second monetary policy strategy review of 2021 (Begg 2021).…”

Section: Non-acute Post-crisis Times: Throughput Legitimacy To the Re...mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Politics of Monetary Union and the Democratic Legitimacy of the ECB as a Strategic Actor

Diessner

2023

Preprint

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Any take on the politics of monetary policy starts from the recognition that a de facto separation of central banking from democratic processes is impossible to achieve fully in a democratic society, even if it is mandated de iure in the form of central bank independence. This implies that monetary authorities, like the European Central Bank (ECB), can and should be evaluated not only in terms of how well they perform according to their own mandates, but also in terms of wider normative criteria of democratic legitimation. This chapter thus submits that to make sense of the politics of Europe’s monetary union we need to focus on the multi-dimensional issue of the legitimacy of the ECB.

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“…17 sessions the ECB President largely repeats what he has already said at the press conferences that precede those hearings before the ECON Committee. 18 The media has thus not developed any particular interest for the dialogue sessions, 19 and the ECB monthly press conferences have in fact been found to attract the most active following by the press and financial markets. 20 Additionally, for a long time MEPs asked rather general economic questions instead of using this opportunity to hold the ECB to account.…”

Section: The Ecb and Its Accountability In The Monetary Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Guaranteeing the ECB’s democratic accountability in the post-Banking Union era: An ever more difficult task?

Fromage

2019

Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law

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Following the Great Financial Crisis, the European Central Bank's functions have been significantly altered. It is now involved in the functioning of a variety of European Union bodies and agencies, new powers in the field of banking supervision have been attributed to it and it has resorted to unconventional monetary policy. Such a concentration of powers arguably gives rise to issues of accountability and institutional balance within the European Union: (i) the resulting institutional framework is particularly complex and difficult to understand; (ii) the numerous functions the European Central Bank assumes makes it increasingly difficult to identify in which arena(s) it should be held to account for which action; and (iii) its role in the different bodies or agencies may vary in theory and in practice, which, in turn, influences the degree to which the European Central Bank should be held to account. This article aims at showing to what extent the European Central Bank's role has multiplied and diversified with a view to assess how it is held to account in those different instances, and what the consequences are for the European Central Bank's democratic accountability, primarily towards the European Parliament, as well as towards the Council of the European Union and national parliaments where applicable.

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Wie transparent ist die Europäische Zentralbank? Eine international vergleichende Betrachtung vor dem Hintergrund der weitreichenden Neuerungen zum Januar 2015

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

On the Monetary Dialogue between the European Central Bank and the European Parliament: From monetary monologue to dialogue—and beyond?

On the Monetary Dialogue between the European Central Bank and the European Parliament: From monetary monologue to dialogue—and beyond?

The Politics of Monetary Union and the Democratic Legitimacy of the ECB as a Strategic Actor

Guaranteeing the ECB’s democratic accountability in the post-Banking Union era: An ever more difficult task?

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