Following the adoption of Eurocrisis Law, the European Parliament (EP) has been strongly empowered in the Economic and Monetary Union. It may intervene mostly in three ways: by the means of control mechanisms around Euro summits, during Economic Dialogues and in the framework of the European Parliamentary Week and the Interparliamentary conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance. An analysis of the practice reveals however that thus far this empowerment has remained largely theoretical; The EP could still better exploit the potential of its newly attributed capacities. The reform proposals currently under discussion were found to bear some potential if adequately used, despite being (still) of a soft nature like the ones currently existing.

The newly established European Banking Union has introduced a unique accountability framework of the European Central Bank vis-à-vis the European Parliament (EP), but also vis-à-vis national parliaments, in the form of Banking Dialogue. The ECB was thus far held to account for its monetary policy actions by the EP in the framework of the long-existing Monetary Dialogue. However, some shortcomings have become apparent in this procedure, especially with the economic crisis. Beyond this, the recent attribution of new competences to the ECB calls for a reflection as to the accountability mechanisms in place to control its actions. Based on an empirical and normative analysis of both types of dialogues, we contend that the Banking Dialogue could serve as a model to reform the Monetary Dialogue to enhance the legitimacy of the ECB's actions and of the EU as a whole.

The participation of the British and the Irish Parliaments should be underlined since both Member States have an opt-out in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice contained in Protocol 21 annexed to the Treaties. Contrary to Denmark, which has a permanent opt-out, Ireland and the UK may decide to opt in which they have not done on this occasion. The UK has repeatedly expressed its strong opposition to this initiative. In its Coalition agreement, the then UK government declared: 'We will approach forthcoming legislation in the area of criminal justice on a case-by-case basis, with a view to maximising our country's security, protecting Britain's civil liberties and preserving the integrity of our criminal justice system. Britain will not participate in the establishment of any European Public Prosecutor' [emphasis added]. 'The Coalition: our programme', 20 May 2010, Chapter 13, 'Europe', 19. This position was confirmed in the Written statement to Parliament submitted by the UK Government on 2 December 2013 which repeated that 'As confirmed in the coalition agreement, the government will not participate in the establishment of any EPPO [and that] We [the Government] will remain a full and active participant in both the Eurojust and EPPO negotiations to defend our national interests'.

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This introductory article sets the ground for the analysis performed in the articles included in this Special Issue. It shows why a new analysis of the European Central Bank (ECB)'s accountability is required by referring to recent developments, and by underlining how much the ECB's role and standing have changed since its creation 20 years ago. Indeed, its resorting to unconventional monetary policies in response to the recent economic and financial crisis, as well as the creation of the Banking Union, have significantly affected the ECB. This introduction also recalls the main elements of the debate on the balance between accountability and independence, and shows how this balance has evolved. On the basis of the findings of the articles included in this Special Issue, some conclusions and hypotheses as to the way forward are formulated.