The newly established European Banking Union has introduced a unique accountability framework of the European Central Bank vis-à-vis the European Parliament (EP), but also vis-à-vis national parliaments, in the form of Banking Dialogue. The ECB was thus far held to account for its monetary policy actions by the EP in the framework of the long-existing Monetary Dialogue. However, some shortcomings have become apparent in this procedure, especially with the economic crisis. Beyond this, the recent attribution of new competences to the ECB calls for a reflection as to the accountability mechanisms in place to control its actions. Based on an empirical and normative analysis of both types of dialogues, we contend that the Banking Dialogue could serve as a model to reform the Monetary Dialogue to enhance the legitimacy of the ECB's actions and of the EU as a whole.

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Il contributo individua due fattori di trasformazione della originaria costituzione eco-nomica italiana, i quali affondano le loro radici culturali nei filoni del fiscal constitutionalism e dell'ordoliberalismo: da un lato l'incorporazione di fiscal rules in fonti rigide e di rango sovraordinato, anche per effetto del processo di integrazione europeo; dall'altro lato, l'incremento del tasso di razionalizzazione delle regole costituzionali sulla formazione della decisione di bilancio. Alla luce di tale evoluzione, il contributo si interroga sulla possibilità di una diversa organizzazione delle regole fiscali e di bilancio, la quale consenta di recuperare e saldare due principi che nell'impianto della Costituzione italiana fanno sistema: i principi di "responsabilità finanziaria" e di "responsabilità politica".