Williams on Supervaluationism and Logical Revisionism

Jones, Nicholas K.

doi:10.5840/jphil20111081135

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 5 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In the next two sections, we show how the nonnormality of Δ plays a crucial role in preventing the gap principle arguments from trivialising the vagueness of Δ and in reconciling supervaluationism with unrestricted higher-order vagueness. 15…”

Section: +δ(A ∧ B)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, as Zardini [32, p. 31] himself points out, one could reject the intersubstitutivity of identicals within Δ-contexts. In that case, its application at lines ( 8) and (15) in the derivation would be faulty. We now show that the failure of the intersubstitutivity of identicals within Δ-contexts naturally arises when one extends the supervaluationist multilateral framework with suitable identity rules.…”

Section: +B (+∃E)mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Meta-inferences and Supervaluationism

Incurvati

Schlöder

2021

J Philos Logic

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Many classically valid meta-inferences fail in a standard supervaluationist framework. This allegedly prevents supervaluationism from offering an account of good deductive reasoning. We provide a proof system for supervaluationist logic which includes supervaluationistically acceptable versions of the classical meta-inferences. The proof system emerges naturally by thinking of truth as licensing assertion, falsity as licensing negative assertion and lack of truth-value as licensing rejection and weak assertion. Moreover, the proof system respects well-known criteria for the admissibility of inference rules. Thus, supervaluationists can provide an account of good deductive reasoning. Our proof system moreover brings to light how one can revise the standard supervaluationist framework to make room for higher-order vagueness. We prove that the resulting logic is sound and complete with respect to the consequence relation that preserves truth in a model of the non-normal modal logic NT. Finally, we extend our approach to a first-order setting and show that supervaluationism can treat vagueness in the same way at every order. The failure of conditional proof and other meta-inferences is a crucial ingredient in this treatment and hence should be embraced, not lamented.

show abstract

Section: +δ(A ∧ B)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: +B (+∃E)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Meta-inferences and Supervaluationism

Incurvati

Schlöder

2021

J Philos Logic

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…E.g.,Jones (2011),Williamson (2018).22 Note that this differs considerably from Sider (2011)'s treatment of a fundamental logical language. He thinks a logic can be fundamental without necessarily describing fundamental entities.…”

mentioning

confidence: 95%

Derivative Indeterminacy

Richardson

2023

Erkenn

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Indeterminacy is metaphysical (or worldly) if it has its source in the way the world is (rather than how it is represented or known). There are two questions we could ask about indeterminacy. First: does it exist? Second: is indeterminacy derivative? I focus on the second question. Specifically, I argue that (at least some) metaphysical indeterminacy can be derivative, where this roughly means that facts about indeterminacy are metaphysically grounded in facts about what is determinate.

show abstract

“…3 Following Williamson (1994), there has been an ongoing debate about the extent to which supervaluationism requires a revision of classical logic. See Williams (2008) and Jones (2011) for discussion.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiple reference and vague objects

Merlo

2016

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Kilimanjaro is an example of what some philosophers would call a 'vague object': it is only roughly 5895 metres tall, its weight is not precise and its boundaries are fuzzy because some particles are neither determinately part of it nor determinately not part of it. It has been suggested that this vagueness arises as a result of semantic indecision: it is because we didn't make up our mind what the expression "Kilimanjaro" applies to that we can truthfully say such things as "It is indeterminate whether this particle is part of Kilimanjaro". After reviewing some of the limitations of this approach, I will propose an alternative account, based on a new semantic relation -multiple reference -capable of holding in a one-many pattern between a term and several objects in the domain. I will explain how multiple reference works, what differentiates it from plural reference and how it might be used to accommodate at least some aspects of our ordinary discourse about vague objects.

show abstract

Williams on Supervaluationism and Logical Revisionism

Cited by 3 publications

References 5 publications

Meta-inferences and Supervaluationism

Meta-inferences and Supervaluationism

Derivative Indeterminacy

Multiple reference and vague objects

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About