Withdrawal and reward reallocation as responses to inequity

Schmitt, David R.; Marwell, Gerald

doi:10.1016/s0022-1031(72)80002-7

Cited by 135 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Esses resultados corroboram aqueles relatados em outros estudos de competição (e.g., Dougherty & Cherek, 1994;Matthews, 1979;Schmitt, 1987Schmitt, , 1998, como também em estudos de cooperação (e.g., de Farias, 2001;Schmitt & Marwell, 1972;Shimoff & Matthews, 1975), e sugerem que a iniqüidade desfavorável de reforços apresenta propriedades aversivas.…”

Section: Discussionunclassified

Instruções e iniqüidade de reforços: efeitos sobre o comportamento competitivo

Abreu‐Rodrigues

Natalino

Aló

2002

Psic.: Teor. e Pesq.

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RESUMO -O presente estudo investigou se a precisão da instrução afetaria os efeitos da iniqüidade de reforços. Trinta estudantes universitários, separados em duplas, escolheram entre trabalhar sozinho ou competir com o parceiro. Na alternativa individual, os pontos foram distribuídos igualmente entre os participantes; na alternativa de competição, a distribuição de pontos foi manipulada no decorrer das condições de modo que o Participante 1 ganhava mais pontos que o Participante 2, ou vice-versa. Algumas duplas receberam informação completa sobre a distribuição de pontos (instrução precisa); outras receberam informação indicando que, algumas vezes, um participante receberia mais pontos que o outro (instrução imprecisa); e, as demais, não receberam nenhuma informação (sem instrução). A instrução imprecisa produziu escolha acentuada por competição para ambos participantes, a instrução precisa gerou escolhas sensíveis às manipulações na iniqüidade e, na ausência de instruções, ambos resultados foram observados. Foi concluído que a instrução precisa gerou estratégias mais eficientes de fuga e esquiva da iniqüidade.Palavras-chave: competição; instrução; iniqüidade. Instructions and Inequity Between Reinforcers: Effects Upon Competitive BehaviorABSTRACT -The present study investigated whether the precision of instructions alter the effects of reinforcement inequity. Thirty university students, separated in dyads, chose between working alone or competing with their partner. During the individual alternative, points were distributed equally between participants; during the competitive alternative, points distribution was manipulated across conditions such that Participant 1 received a greater number of points than Participant 2, and viceversa. The dyads received complete information on points distribution (precise instruction group), vague information indicating only that sometimes one participant would win more points than the other (imprecise instruction group), or no information about points distribution (no instruction group). Imprecise instruction produced an accentuated choice for competition for both participants while the precise instruction generated choices that changed with manipulations in inequity. In the absence of instructions, both results were observed. It was concluded that precise instruction generated more efficient strategies of escape and avoidance from inequity.

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Section: Discussionunclassified

Instruções e iniqüidade de reforços: efeitos sobre o comportamento competitivo

Abreu‐Rodrigues

Natalino

Aló

2002

Psic.: Teor. e Pesq.

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“…There is considerable evidence of equity motives in helping. People who have unfairly received benefits -for example, those who receive too much reward based on their contribution to the group activity -often freely choose to give up some of their reward (Schmitt & Marwell, 1972). Conversely, if people feel that they have been undercompensated, they will be less helpful to coworkers or the company for which they work (Organ & Ryan, 1995).…”

Section: Social Norms and Personal Standardsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Helping and Altruism

Dovidio¹,

Penner²

2003

Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Interpersonal Processes

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“…Previous cooperation studies have shown that such inequity in earnings can influence choice. 1 For example, studies have shown that when one subject in a cooperating pair receives greater benefits from cooperating than the other subject, the underpaid subject may shift to an independent response option (e.g., Schmitt & Marwell, 1972;Shimoff & Matthews., 1975;Spiga, Cherek, Grabowski, & Bennett, 1992). To determine if the presence of the partner's earnings would influence preference, Experiment 1 investigated the effects of earnings budget on choice under conditions in which the partner's total earnings were not shown (Partner's Earnings Absent) or shown (Partner's Earnings Present) on the complUter screen.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk Reduction and Resource Pooling on a Cooperation Task

et al. 2006

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Two experiments investigated choice in adult humans on a simulated cooperation task to evaluate a risk-reduction account of sharing based on the energy-budget rule. The energy-budget rule is an optimal foraging model that predicts risk-averse choices when net energy gains exceed energy requirements (positive energy budget) and risk-prone choices when net energy gains fall below energy requirements (negative energy budget) . Because sharing can minimize variability in energy gain (i.e. , is a riskaverse strategy) , the model predicts that sharing should occur under positive but not negative budget conditions. Energy budgets were modeled by substituting money gains for energy gains and earnings requirements for energy requirements. Participants chose between work-alone or work-with-others (sharing) response options. Experiment 1 investigated the effects on choice of manipulating the value of the earnings requirement and the presence of the partner's money counter. Choice for the sharing option varied as a function of the earnings requirement in a pattern consistent with the predictions of the energy-budget rule. The presence of the partner's money counter did not influence preference. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 and also showed that under conditions with no earnings requirement (conditions in which the energy-budget rule makes no predictions) , subjects often preferred the sharing option over the independent option when sharing increased the partner's 13arnings, and that subjects often preferred an independent option over the sharing option when the independent option produced a constant earnings amount. Overall, the results replicate and extend the results of earlier earnings-budget studies and further show that laboratory procedures are useful for evaluating the plredictions of risksensitive and social-foraging models.

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Withdrawal and reward reallocation as responses to inequity

Cited by 135 publications

References 12 publications

Instruções e iniqüidade de reforços: efeitos sobre o comportamento competitivo

Instruções e iniqüidade de reforços: efeitos sobre o comportamento competitivo

Helping and Altruism

Risk Reduction and Resource Pooling on a Cooperation Task

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