Withdrawn Security Offerings

Mikkelson, Wayne H.; Partch, M. Megan

doi:10.2307/2330876

Cited by 340 publications

(197 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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Section: Event Study Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In our paper, we apply a standardized t-test according to Mikkelson and Partch (1988) and a nonparametric rank test according to Corrado (1989). The standardized t-test of Mikkelson and Partch (1988) considers the nonstationarity of daily stock variances. There is broad evidence that the variance of stock returns increases during the days immediately around the event date (e.g., Patell and Wolfson, 1979).…”

Section: Event Study Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Insider Trading in the Swiss Stock Market

Zingg

Lang

Wyttenbach

2007

Swiss J Economics Statistics

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Section: Event Study Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Event Study Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Insider Trading in the Swiss Stock Market

Zingg

Lang

Wyttenbach

2007

Swiss J Economics Statistics

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“…We investigate the abnormal post-acquisition share performance of utility acquirer firms based on precision weighted cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) with Patell Z tests adjusted for serial dependence (Patell, 1976;Mikkelson and Patch, 1988), and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) using skewness corrected t-statistics (Lyon et al, 1999). We also used the generalized sign Z test for CAARs and BHARs, a nonparametric test controlling for the asymmetry of positive and negative abnormal returns during the estimation period (Cowan, 1992).…”

Section: Stock Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

Merger Motives For U.S. Utility Acquirers: Evidence From Performance, Risk Metrics, And Executive Compensation

Dube

Francis-Gladney

Romero

et al. 2011

JBER

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We study post-acquisition performance of US public utilities that acquired other US exchange listed firms during [1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002] INTRODUCTIONignificant Merger and Acquisition (M&A) activity commenced for the utility industry following the Energy Policy Act of 1992. The restructurings are in response to deregulation efforts because of technological advancements such as efficient small-scale plants, and transmission systems that facilitate distribution over wider areas, reducing entry barriers and the need for local monopolies (Becker-Blease et al., 2004). Typical reasons why mergers would benefit consumers and shareholders are similar to those provided for M&A activity in other industries, such as potential increases in efficiency, economies of scale, diversification in the sources of power generation and geographic diversification leading to correction of regional imbalances.Results from prior research into whether mergers and acquisitions benefit acquirer shareholders, or the economy as a whole, have been sufficiently contradictory that surveys of the same literature reach different interpretations (Buchholtz, 1991) 1 . For M&A activity in general, acquirer shareholders lose in 65% of the cases around the time of the announcement (Sirower and O'Byrne, 1998). Whether this is because of market inefficiency and acquirer shareholders recoup the losses over the long term is unclear due to methodological biases in long-term studies. However research (e.g. Cakici, 2004) based on recent methodological prescriptions of Barber and Lyon, (1997), Lyon et al (1999) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) tends to support Fama's (1998) contention that the evidence against market inefficiency is weak and evidence of mispricing disappears when methodological biases are removed.Utility mergers differ from those in unregulated industries in that there is greater regulatory oversight and it takes longer to accomplish the mergers. Additionally, there are restrictions on what benefits can be retained by the company and what must be passed on to the consumers (see for example Berry, 1998; Blecker-Blease et al., 2004). 1 For example Mueller (1980), Halpern (1983, Jensesn and Ruback (1983), Lubatkin (1983), Conn (1985), and Caves (1989. See also Hubbard and Palia (1999) and Agrawal and Jaffe (2000). Our study of the post-acquisition performance of US utilities that acquired other US exchanged listed firms during 1996-2002 also suggests that acquirer shareholders do not gain any abnormal returns from the acquisition over the two years following the acquisition and that stock acquirers showed a decrease in performance. There was no unexpected gain in the underlying operating performance of the company. We also find that the CEO salary increased relative to the industry for stock mergers. This suggests that method of payment may be an important factor in discerning the motivation for an acquisition. Lack of clarity regarding effects of a complex process like an acquisition, for shareholders and perhaps the ev...

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“…The cumulative average excess return for the 27 funds for the 2-day announcement period (t ϭ 0, ϩ1) is 1.56% with a z-value of 3.87 using the parametric test based on standardized excess returns (Mikkelson and Partch 1988). We also test the significanc of the excess return using the nonparametric rank test introduced in Corrado (1989) and the rank statistic is 3.07 for the 2-day excess return.…”

Section: A Excess Returnsmentioning

confidence: 99%