Wittgenstein on forms of life: a short introduction

Abstract

This paper is an introductory exploration of the notion of 'forms of life' in the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The notion of 'forms of life' is central to understanding Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Even though this is the case, there have been a variety of interpretations of this notion in the literature on Wittgenstein's thought. In part this is due to Wittgenstein's infrequent reference to 'forms of life'. The term 'form of life' only appears five times in the Philosophical Investigations, the central text of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. It is a point of debate whether the notion of 'forms of life' commits Wittgenstein to a form of relativism. This paper explores this problem. We argue that it is entirely possible for members of different conceptual communities to engage in dialogue with each other on Wittgenstein's view. We argue that Wittgenstein was not a cognitive relativist. Wittgenstein's conviction was that truth is bound to this complicated form of life, or the fundamentally human perspective. His view of truth remains perspectival. Members of different conceptual communities can enter into dialogue. Other 'forms of life' are available to "us" and members of diverse groups can change their views.

English School Special Section

“…These differences, in Wittgensteinian terms, in the respective forms of life are to be understood from the point of cultural and not cognitive relativism. 163 The latter would mean that 'individuals belonging to one conceptual community will be unable to grasp at all what it is like to be a member of another community', 164 whereas I follow Tonner in understanding Wittgenstein in cultural relativist terms, i.e. 'that there are differences between different cultures or in the history of one particular culture with regards to social, moral and religious values and practices'.…”

Emancipating ethics: an autonomist reading of Islamic forms of life in Russia

“…The notion of Lebensform has been made immensely popular by Ludwig Wittgenstein and his followers (Wittgenstein 1986(Wittgenstein [1953: 226e; see also Kishik 2008;Tonner 2017). Yet over the course of many decades, its contours have remained vague and its potential declinations near-endless, including: ways of living; modes of discourse; worldviews; language practices; biological realities; cognitive styles; fields of possibility; problem-solving mechanisms; and extraordinarily different types of community ranging from 'primitive/alien cultures' to organized faiths in the late-modern West.…”