It has already been empirically verified that for many Bronze Age monuments erected in Scotland between 1400-900 BC, there was a concerted effort on behalf of the builders to align their monuments to astronomical bodies on the horizon. It has also been found that there are two common sets of complex landscape and astronomical patternings, combining specific horizon qualities (like distance and elevation) with the rising and setting points of particular astronomical phenomena. However, it has only been very recently demonstrated by us that that the visible astronomical-landscape variables found at Bronze Age sites on the inner isles and mainland of western Scotland were first established nearly two millennia earlier, with the erection of the mooted first standing-stone 'great circles' in Britain: Callanish and Stenness of Scotland. In this paper we demonstrate the connection between all of these monuments and the large LN circles south of Scotland, namely those of Castlerigg and Swinside in Cumbria, England.

This paper is an introductory exploration of the notion of 'forms of life' in the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The notion of 'forms of life' is central to understanding Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Even though this is the case, there have been a variety of interpretations of this notion in the literature on Wittgenstein's thought. In part this is due to Wittgenstein's infrequent reference to 'forms of life'. The term 'form of life' only appears five times in the Philosophical Investigations, the central text of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. It is a point of debate whether the notion of 'forms of life' commits Wittgenstein to a form of relativism. This paper explores this problem. We argue that it is entirely possible for members of different conceptual communities to engage in dialogue with each other on Wittgenstein's view. We argue that Wittgenstein was not a cognitive relativist. Wittgenstein's conviction was that truth is bound to this complicated form of life, or the fundamentally human perspective. His view of truth remains perspectival. Members of different conceptual communities can enter into dialogue. Other 'forms of life' are available to "us" and members of diverse groups can change their views.

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This paper argues that any museum's collecting policy must face up to the problem of vulnerability. Taking as a starting point an item in the collections of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, I argue that the basic responsibility of museums to collect 'things', and to communicate information about them in a truthful way brings their collecting practice into the epistemological domain of testimony and into the normative domain of ethics. Museums are public spaces of memory, testimony, representation and interpretation that at once enable humanity to hold to account those who transgress while at the same time holding to account those who witness these transgressions. By virtue of this, museums can be considered spaces of ethics wherein testimonial and hermeneutic injustice can be confronted and challenged.