Worksharing: A Calibrated Model

Villemeur, Étienne Billette de; Cremer, Helmuth; Boldron, François; Roy, Bernard

doi:10.2202/1446-9022.1149

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 5 publications

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“…Article 1 of the Second Postal Directive (2002/39/EC) clarified the scope of price regulation, specifying that these prices: "shall take into account avoided costs with the standard services covering the complete range of features offered for the clearance, transport, sorting and delivery of individual postal items." Such pricing linked to avoided costs bound two market segments (single-item and bulk), which had different demand characteristics (such as price elasticity), and therefore limited the ability for postal operators to compete on a level playing field (see [10]). The Third Postal Directive loosened the avoided cost constraints on pricing; only the preamble now refers to this principle.…”

Section: Postal Policy In the Eumentioning

confidence: 99%

Postal-sector policy: From monopoly to regulated competition and beyond

Jaag¹

2014

Utilities Policy

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This paper discusses the main aspects of the competitive and regulatory state of the postal sector. It presents the different models for postal competition and regulation in the EU and the US and their history, together with their implications on regulation, with a focus on universal services and network access. While postal monopolies used to be the main source of funding for universal service obligations, the need for alternative funding sources after full liberalization has increased the interest of regulators and the public in knowing the cost of these obligations. In parallel, new means of electronic communication and consumer needs call the traditional scope of universal services into question. This paper outlines the economic rationale of current policies and directions for future postal regulation to strengthen the postal services' commercial viability in a competitive age, while safeguarding their relevant characteristics for the economy. Market regulation Universal Service regulation Designation Financing mechanism Costing (calculation of net cost) Market equilibrium Definition of obligations Flanking measures Market access regulation Network access and price regulation Interconnection, interoperability

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Section: Postal Policy In the Eumentioning

confidence: 99%

Postal-sector policy: From monopoly to regulated competition and beyond

Jaag¹

2014

Utilities Policy

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Price Regulation and the Financing of Universal Services in Network Industries

Jaag¹

2013

Review of Law &Amp; Economics

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This article explores the complementary roles of price regulation and universal service regulation in network industries. It analyzes compensation for the universal service provider (USP) by public finances and a fund to which operators contribute. As long as the USP enjoys market power, price regulation may serve as a means to finance universal services. This implies allowing for price increases to compensate for the net cost of the universal service obligation. It releases competing operators or the general government budget from contributing to its financing but results in distorted pricing and reduced overall welfare due to inefficient entry. The analysis shows that current practices of costing and financing universal services may result in unintended market distortions. The article quantifies these effects and demonstrates how such distortions can be avoided.

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Worksharing: A Calibrated Model

Cited by 2 publications

References 5 publications

Postal-sector policy: From monopoly to regulated competition and beyond

Postal-sector policy: From monopoly to regulated competition and beyond

Price Regulation and the Financing of Universal Services in Network Industries

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