Proceedings of the 2010 New Security Paradigms Workshop 2010
DOI: 10.1145/1900546.1900559
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Would a 'cyber warrior' protect us

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

2012
2012
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
4
2
1

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 18 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 11 publications
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Vulnerabilities get discovered and patched, and target systems can change their software/ hardware at their will, so the period of effectiveness for a cyber weapon is undefined, but likely to decrease the longer the vulnerability is known. This aspect is also discussed in Moore, Friedman, and Procaccia (2010).…”
Section: The Cyber Domain and Its Weaponsmentioning
confidence: 94%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Vulnerabilities get discovered and patched, and target systems can change their software/ hardware at their will, so the period of effectiveness for a cyber weapon is undefined, but likely to decrease the longer the vulnerability is known. This aspect is also discussed in Moore, Friedman, and Procaccia (2010).…”
Section: The Cyber Domain and Its Weaponsmentioning
confidence: 94%
“…As time passes, other parties discover vulnerabilities in a non-deterministic manner. When a party, p, discovers a vulnerability, v, we can assume that their defences are upgraded, making weapons exploiting vulnerability v ineffective against party p. Research by Moore et al (2010) proposes a similar vulnerabilitybased look but assumes the opposite, that one's own infrastructure is not patched to warn the opposing parties of discovered vulnerabilities, coming to noteworthy conclusions.…”
Section: Cyber Weapons Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…42 Moore, Friedman and Procassia designed two games applicable in national security context, "vulnerability stockpiles" and "cyber hawk", with imperfect information as fundamental property and explored the trade-offs between attack and defence of information systems. 43 A comprehensive study of Sinha et.al. reported on practical application of repeated Stackelberg security games (again non-cooperative incomplete information games) in fields ranging from critical infrastructure protection, through interdicting illegal flow of drugs, weapons and money, to protecting endangered wildlife, forests and fisheries, and security in cyberspace.…”
Section: Incentives Of Actorsmentioning
confidence: 99%