Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States

Abstract

Could a conventional war with the United States inadvertently prompt Chinese nuclear escalation? The military-technical threat that such a war would pose to China's retaliatory capability—combined with wartime perceptual dynamics that might cause China to view this threat in an especially pessimistic light—could lead to reasonable Chinese fears that the United States might be attempting conventional counterforce, or considering or preparing for nuclear counterforce. China might see several forms of limited nuclear escalation as its least-bad response to this sort of threat to its nuclear deterrent, notwithstanding the country's no-first-use policy. This finding, derived from a more general framework about the military-technical and perceptual drivers of potential nuclear escalation in response to conventional counterforce, has broader ramifications for U.S. policy and military strategy, and it illustrates recurring dilemmas that the United States may face in conventional wars with other nuclear-armed adversaries.

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“…110 If North Korea were to bolster positive control, then it could raise the risk of accidental nuclear use and inadvertent escalation or enable launch by rogue commanders. 111 To enhance survivability, North Korea also could hasten efforts to develop International Security 45:3 34 potentially destabilizing weapons systems. For example, it may accelerate efforts to develop an SSB.…”

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“…Indeed, criticism of deterrence by punishment often revolves around the assumption that China's nuclear arsenal imposes serious restrictions on offensive concepts that lean on direct U.S. attack on Chinese territory. Additionally, it is often argued that punishment is distinctively unappealing for U.S. regional allies, because they risk a full scale Chinese retaliatory attack against their own territories (Talmadge, 2017). These considerations have led the United States to think beyond punishment, and explain the increasing popularity of deterrence by denial in a Western Pacific context.…”

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