Would you mind if I get more? An experimental study of the envy game

Abstract

Envy is often the cause of mutually harmful outcomes. We experimentally study the impact of envy in a bargaining setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the size of the pie to be shared with a responder, whose share is exogenously fixed. Responders can accept or reject the proposal, with game types differing in the consequences of rejection: all four combinations of (not) self-harming and (not) other-harming are considered. We find that envy leads responders to reject high proposer claims, especially when rejection harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict and results in a considerable loss of efficiency.JEL classification: D63, D74, C91, C72.

An Improved Revenue Distribution Model for Logistics Service Supply Chain Considering Fairness Preference

“…For example, people may sacrifice some of their revenue to pursue fairness of revenue. Therefore, people's behavioral decisions are not only affected by profits, but also by social factors [20,21].…”

Conveyance, envy, and homeowner choice of appliances

“…This reasoning is anchored within a large body of empirical literature revealing that envious individuals react negatively when others are better off or receive undeserved payments (e.g. Zizzo and Oswald, 2001;Beckman et al, 2002;Casal et al, 2012).…”

An Ultimatum Game with Multidimensional Response Strategies

“…In these variants, the decision of the responder can be either only self-damaging-like in the impunity game (e.g., Bolton and Zwick, 1995;Yamagishi et al, 2009;Yamagishi et al, 2012) or only other-damaging-like in the punity game (e.g., Güth and Huck, 1997;Huck, 1999;Casal et al, 2012). 1 Thus, in both types of games, a responder who wants to convey his disapproval for the offer made by the proposer has a single action at his disposal: either destroying his own money or destroying the proposer's money.…”

“…The proposer suggests a division of an amount of money (the 'pie'), and the responder makes two decisions: he decides whether or not to collect the money allocated to him, and whether or not to sanction the proposer by destroying the money that he demanded for himself. Only if the responder 1 The punity game has been called "spite game" by Huck (1999) and "envy game" by Casal et al (2012). A further variant of the UG is the dictator game, which is actually a one person decision task granting the responder no veto power at all.…”