No abstract

When the phenomenon of tax evasion is discussed, both scholars and authorities agree on the fact that, although essential, classical enforcements are not enough to ensure tax compliance: some other forms of incentives must be adopted.The paper's aim is to experimentally test the role of di↵erent nonmonetary incentives for tax compliance: participants have been treated with di↵erent experimental conditions, which di↵er in the role played by anonymity. Indeed, subjects have been informed on the possibility of revealing their identity and their choices through the publication of their pictures, as a consequence of the result of the auditing process.As expected, anonymity plays an important role in the decision to pay taxes; in addition, we find that negative non-monetary incentive increases tax compliance more e↵ectively than positive non-monetary incentive. We find also that the e↵ect of these non-monetary incentives is mitigated, when too many information are made available.Finally, results show that, when evasion is made public, tax-dodgers are willing to pay in order to keep secret their cheating behavior and avoid public shame.

Feedback is an effective tool for promoting efficient behavior: it enhances individuals’ awareness of choice consequences in complex settings. Our study aims to isolate the mechanisms underlying the effects of feedback on achieving efficient behavior in a controlled environment. We design a laboratory experiment in which individuals are not aware of the consequences of different alternatives and, thus, cannot easily identify the efficient ones. We introduce feedback as a mechanism to enhance the awareness of consequences and to stimulate exploration and search for efficient alternatives. We assess the efficacy of three different types of intervention: provision of social information, manipulation of the frequency, and framing of feedback. We find that feedback is most effective when it is framed in terms of losses, that it reduces efficiency when it includes information about inefficient peers’ behavior, and that a lower frequency of feedback does not disrupt efficiency. By quantifying the effect of different types of feedback, our study suggests useful insights for policymakers.

No abstract

Envy is often the cause of mutually harmful outcomes. We experimentally study the impact of envy in a bargaining setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the size of the pie to be shared with a responder, whose share is exogenously fixed. Responders can accept or reject the proposal, with game types differing in the consequences of rejection: all four combinations of (not) self-harming and (not) other-harming are considered. We find that envy leads responders to reject high proposer claims, especially when rejection harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict and results in a considerable loss of efficiency.JEL classification: D63, D74, C91, C72.