2020 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) 2020
DOI: 10.1109/eurosp48549.2020.00014
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X-Men: A Mutation-Based Approach for the Formal Analysis of Security Ceremonies

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Cited by 7 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…In particular, when carrying out a (formal or even semi-formal) analysis of a security ceremony, one should consider also the mistakes that human users may make through their active participation, and that have the potential to lead to violations of the security properties that the ceremony was intended to guarantee. A number of approaches have been proposed to this end, e.g., discussing different threat models of security ceremonies (Sempreboni et al, 2019), providing frameworks for the analysis of security ceremonies (Bella et al, 2022;Carlos et al, 2012), or explicitly modelling and reasoning about human errors in security ceremonies (Basin et al, 2015;Basin et al, 2016;Sempreboni and Viganò, 2020).…”
Section: Security Ceremonies-the Basicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In particular, when carrying out a (formal or even semi-formal) analysis of a security ceremony, one should consider also the mistakes that human users may make through their active participation, and that have the potential to lead to violations of the security properties that the ceremony was intended to guarantee. A number of approaches have been proposed to this end, e.g., discussing different threat models of security ceremonies (Sempreboni et al, 2019), providing frameworks for the analysis of security ceremonies (Bella et al, 2022;Carlos et al, 2012), or explicitly modelling and reasoning about human errors in security ceremonies (Basin et al, 2015;Basin et al, 2016;Sempreboni and Viganò, 2020).…”
Section: Security Ceremonies-the Basicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It should be noted that, while formal analysis approaches and tools have advanced to the maturity that allows for the automated analysis of such complex security protocols as TLS 3.1(Blanchet, 2018) and 5G Authentication(Basin et al, 2018), as well as of security ceremonies such as those considered inBasin et al (2016),Bella et al (2022), andSempreboni and Viganò (2020), formal analysis of security protocols and ceremonies in the presence of an active attacker is an undecidable problem, so there is no guarantee that tools will terminate with a proof or a counterexample to the protocol's or ceremony's security. It is thus good practice to complement formal analysis with other approaches such as risk analysis or security assurance approaches (see, e.g., ENISA2022).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In more recent works, such as [Sempreboni and Viganò 2020], the authors model the mistakes that humans make when participating in a security ceremony through mutation rules. Such rules model possible human behaviours, automatically adjusting the behaviour of the other agents of the ceremony as well.…”
Section: Basin Et Al Propose a Formal Modelling Of The Human Limitati...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Sempreboni and Viganò consider the mutations provoked by human users to be of the following natures: skipping one or more of the actions that the user was supposed to perform, switching/replacing messages, or adding an unforeseen action to the ceremony execution [Sempreboni and Viganò 2020]. To automate their proposal, they have developed a prototype tool that extends Tamarin, called X-Men.…”
Section: Basin Et Al Propose a Formal Modelling Of The Human Limitati...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This article addresses the general challenge of how to model human threats in security ceremonies with the aim of studying the security properties more realistically than it has been possible so far, that is, in front of users who may raise threats beyond making errors, namely not only by disclosing information or passing objects but also by forging physical elements. While threats that humans raise against the technical system directly, namely by individual interactions with it, have already been investigated [3], the focus of this article is on their extension with threats that humans raise against the technical system indirectly, namely by interacting with other threatening humans without explicit collusion. In other words, we define and formalise threats both on human-to-system channels and on human-to-human channels.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%