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Cited by 60 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Crucially, unlike NICE, the ATHAPol merely reported (unsystematically) the mere fact of reporting a conflict of interest by an expert, without mentioning its nature, extent or commercial interests involved. More broadly, the challenges to transparency identified in AHTAPol's VAs, and to some extent in NICE's STA process, highlight two major concerns, familiar to students of delegation of authority to non-majoritarian institutions: the risk of their capture by private interests, and the uncertainty about the quality and efficiency of their work (Pollitt et al 2001, Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001, Thatcher 2002. To prevent risks and suspicions of regulatory capture, HTA bodies (including NICE and the AHTAPol) introduce rules on conflicts of interest.…”
Section: Conclusion and Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Crucially, unlike NICE, the ATHAPol merely reported (unsystematically) the mere fact of reporting a conflict of interest by an expert, without mentioning its nature, extent or commercial interests involved. More broadly, the challenges to transparency identified in AHTAPol's VAs, and to some extent in NICE's STA process, highlight two major concerns, familiar to students of delegation of authority to non-majoritarian institutions: the risk of their capture by private interests, and the uncertainty about the quality and efficiency of their work (Pollitt et al 2001, Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001, Thatcher 2002. To prevent risks and suspicions of regulatory capture, HTA bodies (including NICE and the AHTAPol) introduce rules on conflicts of interest.…”
Section: Conclusion and Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Examples of such public/private hybrid organisations are state-owned enterprises, agencies and other forms of quasi non-governmental organisations (or quangos) that not only operate at arm's length from their political masters but also undertake commercial activities on behalf of government, mixing them with their activities related to public interests (Bruton et al, 2015;Pollitt et al, , 2001van Thiel, 2000;Verhoest, 2011). Such hybrid organisations can be found in many countries (Billis, 2010b;Grohs, 2014;Grossi and Thomasson, 2015;Karré, 2011;Koppell, 2003;Kosar, 2011;Rhodes and Donnelly-Cox, 2014;Seidman, 1988) and are not a new phenomenon.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Different countries have chosen quite different models, ranging from integrated agencies, through semi-dependent agencies to rather independent agencies, where the potential influence of the professional group is highest. With the New Public Management reform wave, the tendency was towards 'agencification' with substantial agency autonomy; this became a fashionable reform template that has spread around the world (Pollitt, Bathgate, Caulfield, & Smullen, 2001). Agencies should have more managerial autonomy but not more policy autonomy, and managerial accountability should be strengthened without weakening political accountability (Laegreid, 2014).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%