Yes, the baby should live: a pro-choice response to Giubilini and Minerva

Manninen, Bertha Alvarez

doi:10.1136/medethics-2012-100656

Cited by 10 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…[19] Killing such neonates would literally be a kind of 'after-birth abortion.' 18 [23,24] The concept of 'after-birth abortion' has been widely criticised as nothing other than infanticide, [25][26][27][28][29] though some authors have continued to defend it. 19 [30] Claiming that many neonates with congenital anomalies are merely 'detached body parts' would likely be met with the same charge and rejection.…”

Section: Gestatelings 'Birth' and Metamorphosismentioning

confidence: 99%

Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb

2020

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The rapid development of artificial womb technologies means that we must consider if and when it is permissible to kill the human subject of ectogestation—recently termed a ‘gestateling’ by Elizabeth Chloe Romanis—prior to ‘birth’. We describe the act of deliberately killing the gestateling as gestaticide and argue that there are good reasons to maintain that gestaticide is morally equivalent to infanticide, which we consider to be morally impermissible. First, we argue that gestaticide is harder to justify than abortion, primarily because the gestateling is completely independent of its biological parents. Second, we argue that gestaticide is morally equivalent to infanticide. To demonstrate this, we explain that gestatelings are born in a straightforward sense, which entails that killing them is as morally serious as infanticide. However, to strengthen our overall claim, we also show that if gestatelings are not considered to have been born, killing them is still equivalent to killing neonates with congenital anomalies and disabilities, which again is infanticide. We conclude by considering how our discussion of gestaticide has implications for the permissibility of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from gestatelings.

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Section: Gestatelings 'Birth' and Metamorphosismentioning

confidence: 99%

Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb

2020

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“…Kaczor, Manninen, Hendricks, and Rodger et al, on the other hand, argue that infanticide is impermissible. [17][18][19][20][21] If infanticide is impermissible, then insofar as gestatelings share the same moral status as newborns, terminating gestatelings will be just as wrong as infanticide. So while I show that gestatelings share the same vii In what follows, I rely on an argument that resembles the form of one advanced by Alexander R. Pruss, though Pruss's argument occurs in a different context.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Subjects of ectogenesis: are ‘gestatelings’ fetuses, newborns or neither?

Colgrove

2019

J Med Ethics

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Subjects of ectogenesis—human beings that are developing in artificial wombs (AWs)—share the same moral status as newborns. To demonstrate this, I defend two claims. First, subjects of partial ectogenesis—those that develop in utero for a time before being transferred to AWs—are newborns (in the full sense of the word). Second, subjects of complete ectogenesis—those who develop in AWs entirely—share the same moral status as newborns. To defend the first claim, I rely on Elizabeth Chloe Romanis’s distinctions between fetuses, newborns and subjects of ectogenesis. For Romanis, the subject of partial ectogenesis ‘is neither a fetus nor a baby’ but is, instead, a ‘new product of human reproduction’. In this essay, I begin by, expanding upon Romanis’s argument that subjects of partial ectogenesis are not fetuses while arguing that those subjects are newborns. Next, I show that the distinction that Romanis draws between subjects of partial ectogenesis and newborns needs to be revised. The former is a kind of the latter. This leads us to an argument that shows why different moral statuses cannot be justifiably assigned to subjects of partial ectogenesis and subjects of complete ectogenesis, respectively. As subjects of partial ectogenesis share the same moral status as newborns, it follows that subjects of complete ectogenesis share the same moral status as newborns as well. Iconclude by considering implications that this essay may have for the research and development of AW technology and conceptual links between a subject’s moral status and birth.

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“…Consistency would appear to require both abortion and infanticide to be morally permissible. Because personhood has traditionally been the marker for moral status, and plays a role in Giubilini’s and Minerva’s argument, some argue against the pair on grounds that they presuppose an incorrect or controversial account of personhood 8. Others argue personhood is only one possible determinate of moral status,9 and that it is possible for something to have moral status without being a person.…”

Section: The Difference In Moral Status Between Fetuses and Newbornsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fetuses, newborns, & parental responsibility

Singh

2019

J Med Ethics

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I defend a relational account of difference in the moral status between fetuses and newborns. The difference in moral status between a fetus and a newborn is that the newborn baby is the proper object of ‘parental responsibility’ whereas the fetus is not. ‘Parental responsibilities’ are a moral dimension of a ‘parent-child relation’, a relation which newborn babies stand in, but fetuses do not. I defend this relational account by analysing the concepts of ‘parent’ and ‘child’, and conclude that the difference in the moral status between fetuses and newborns means one may claim abortion is morally permissible while also claiming infanticide is not morally permissible, without inconsistency between the two claims.

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Yes, the baby should live: a pro-choice response to Giubilini and Minerva

Cited by 10 publications

References 17 publications

Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb

Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb

Subjects of ectogenesis: are ‘gestatelings’ fetuses, newborns or neither?

Fetuses, newborns, & parental responsibility

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