Young Children's Comprehension of Pretend Episodes: The Integration of Successive Actions

Abstract

In 3 experiments, children's comprehension of successive pretend actions was examined. In Experiment 1, children (25-38 months) watched 2 linked actions (e.g., a puppet poured pretend cereal or powder into a bowl, and then pretended to feed the contents of the bowl to a toy animal). Children realized that the pretend substance was incorporated into the second action. In Experiment 2, children (24-39 months) again watched 2 linked actions (e.g., a puppet poured pretend milk or powder into a container, and then pretended to tip the contents of the container over a toy animal). They realized that the animal would become "milky" or "powdery." In Experiment 3, children (25-36 months) drew similar conclusions regarding a substitute rather than an imaginary entity. The results are discussed with reference to children's causal understanding, their capacity for talking about objects and events in terms of their make-believe and real status, and the processes underlying pretense comprehension.

The explanatory structure of unexplainable events: Causal constraints on magical reasoning

“…Two-yearolds, for instance, recognize that, when pretending to pour tea from an empty teapot into an empty cup, tea has been transferred from the teapot to the cup and will spill out of the cup if the cup is overturned (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993;Harris, Kavanaugh, & Meredith, 1994). Four-year-olds can distinguish the properties of one pretend world (the world of Batman) from another (the world of SpongeBob) and keep those properties separate when pretending to interact with those worlds (Skolnick Weisberg & Bloom, 2009) or drawing inferences about what is likely to be true in those worlds (Skolnick & Bloom, 2006).…”

The pretence–reality distinction – confusion, emotion and source monitoring

“…Likewise, studies demonstrating children's ability to differentiate the real and pretend identities of objects used in pretence have used verbal tasks (e.g. Amsel et al , 1996;Flavell et al , 1987;Harris et al , 1994;Lillard & Flavell, 1992;Woolley, 1995a;Woolley & Wellman, 1990; see also Custer, 1996). In contrast, studies suggesting pretence-reality confusion have typically used behavioural measures (e.g.…”

“…For example, Wellman and Estes (1986) asked children to discuss the characteristics of mental entities relating to everyday objects such as cookies (see also Estes et al , 1989;Harris et al , 1991;Kinoshita, 1994). Likewise, children readily differentiate the pretend and real identities of everyday objects such as a sponge that had been used as a truck (Flavell et al , 1987; see also Amsel et al , 1996;Custer, 1996;Harris et al , 1994;Woolley, 1995a;Woolley & Wellman, 1990). Furthermore, many findings relating to pretence-reality confusions have involved supernatural entities.…”

“…Children as young as 3 years old reliably state what an object really is and what it has been pretended to be (e.g. Flavell, Flavell & Green, 1987;Harris, Kavanaugh & Meredith, 1994;Lillard & Flavell, 1992;Woolley, 1995a;Woolley & Wellman, 1990). For instance, in Flavell, Flavell and Green's study, children correctly stated that although the experimenter was pretending that a sponge was a truck, it was really a sponge.…”

When actions are carved at the joints

“…A third possible criterion for attributing program-level comprehension is the ability to watch two sequentially coordinated actions and either reproduce them in the correct order or exhibit an understanding of the way that the outcome of the first action causally enables the second (Harris et al 1996). Such actions, however, may be simply encoded not as a hierarchical program but as a linear sequence of action-outcome pairs.…”