No abstract

The results of these studies indicated that children younger than 1 year possess the cognitive capability of translating a perception of a novel action into their own behavior. However, the likelihood of imitation varied as a function of the nature of the target behavior. For example, actions requiring direct social commerce with the examiner were imitated less frequently than simple motor behaviors with objects, and reproducing gestures was more common than vocalizations. Moreover, imitation seemed to depend upon the child's level of mental development--the imitation of coordinated sequences, which requires the child to associate two external events, lagged behind the imitation of single-unit behaviors. There was no evidence for individual traits of general imitativeness, at least not until symbolic relations were involved. Live models were imitated more than TV models but only prior to age 3. While children under 2 years of age were not facile at imitating sequences of behaviors or delaying performance at short time after modeling, older toddlers readily and accurately imitated televised sequences even after a 24-hour delay. Whereas socially extroverted and fearless children imitated live models more than shy children, TV imitation was not related to temperament, home TV viewing habits, or parental education. Finally, the experience of being imitated may facilitate the social cognition of influencing another person.

Theorists have speculated about the symbolic underpinnings of theory of mind (ToM), but no study has examined them across the main developmental span of ToM. Here, the onset of symbolic understandings in three domains (pretend play, language, and understanding representations) and ToM was examined. Fifty-eight children were tested on batteries of tasks four times from ages 2.5 to 5 years. Some significant interrelations among variables were seen at each age level. Canonical correlation analysis found that a subset of the symbolic variables was significantly related to ToM at ages 4 and 5, providing the best evidence to date that ToM is undergirded by a symbolic element that also supports language, pretend play, and representational understanding.

In 3 experiments, children's comprehension of successive pretend actions was examined. In Experiment 1, children (25-38 months) watched 2 linked actions (e.g., a puppet poured pretend cereal or powder into a bowl, and then pretended to feed the contents of the bowl to a toy animal). Children realized that the pretend substance was incorporated into the second action. In Experiment 2, children (24-39 months) again watched 2 linked actions (e.g., a puppet poured pretend milk or powder into a container, and then pretended to tip the contents of the container over a toy animal). They realized that the animal would become "milky" or "powdery." In Experiment 3, children (25-36 months) drew similar conclusions regarding a substitute rather than an imaginary entity. The results are discussed with reference to children's causal understanding, their capacity for talking about objects and events in terms of their make-believe and real status, and the processes underlying pretense comprehension.

Children's grasp of make-believe transformations was studied. In Experiment 1, children saw an adult enact a pretend change (e.g., sprinkling pretend talcum powder over a toy cat). They indicated the pretend outcome by choosing between a picture depicting no change (e.g., cat without talcum powder on its body) and a picture depicting the pretend change (e.g., cat covered with talcum powder). Older children (M = 29 months) chose correctly, but younger children (M = 21 months) did not. A similar age change emerged in Experiment 2 despite the addition of a picture of an irrelevant transformation. Experiment 3 showed that children with autism can imagine pretend transformations. Implications for children's imagination and the autistic syndrome are discussed.