Youth Violence in Central America

Abstract

The article analyzes the social construction of youth violence in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador on the one hand, and the related security policies of the three states, on the other. In each country, there is an idiosyncratic way of constructing youth violence and juvenile delinquency. Also, each country has its own manner of reaction to those problems. In El Salvador youths are socially constructed as a threat to security, and the state implements predominantly repressive policies to protect citizens against that threat. In Nicaragua and Costa Rica, where the social discourse on youth violence is less prominent, the state’s policies are neither very accentuated nor very coherent, whether in terms of repressive or nonrepressive measures. There are strong relationships and mutual influences between the public’s fear (or disregard) of youth violence and the state’s policies to reduce it.

De la Mano Dura al Enfrentamiento Directo: vaivenes de las políticas públicas en El Salvador

“…La rebelión de los rangos menores y más jóvenes ha tomado mayor control sobre las operaciones (Santos 2014). Este cambio dentro de la estructura, organización y relaciones dentro de la pandilla fue motivado por las detenciones y encarcelamientos masivos realizados por las políticas represivas (Peetz 2010). Esta tesis es compartida por Kinosian (2016, p. 9) al interpretar que "los líderes encarcelados de las pandillas fueron transferidos de vuelta a prisiones de máxima seguridad, se interrumpiósu comunicación con los miembros de la calle, y los desencantados miembros de rango medio asumieron mayor control".…”

Beyond Gang Truces and Mano Dura Policies: Towards Substitutive Security Governance in Latin America

“…However, Peetz (2010Peetz ( : 1485 and Fogelbach (2011: 452) observe that such mano extendida (' outstretched hand') and mano amiga ('friendly hand') policies were notoriously underfunded and lacked serious commitment from the governments in question. Thus, despite significant financial and technical support from donor countries, UN agencies, and international organisations such as the World Bank, Rodgers and Muggah (2009: 311) suspect that states were guided by 'ulterior motives' when announcing secondgeneration anti-gang policies, which were found to be 'highly cosmetic, and principally aimed at pleasing potential donors and raising international funds'.…”

Postwar Youth Violence: A Mirror of the Relationship between Youth and Adult Society

“…Although levels of direct physical violence differ significantly in Cambodia and Guatemala, in both countries marginalized and poor youth are perceived as the main perpetrators of violence (Hensengerth 2008b;Kurtenbach 2008c;Peetz 2010). The specific features of postwar 27 Guatemala's indigenous population consists mostly of Mayan descendants, who are divided into 24 language groups, plus numerically small groups of Xinca and Garífuna.…”

“…5 On motivation see literature in FN 1; on response see Cunningham et al (2008), Hagedorn (2007), Klein and Maxson (2006), Peetz (2010); on youth needs see FN 4.…”