Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between e-government and corruption in developed and developing countries. Specifically, we investigate two issues -(1) the impact of the use of e-government on corruption in countries around the world and (2) whether the impact of e-government on corruption will be higher in developed or developing countries. In order to examine these relationships we develop and test empirical models that investigate these relationships. The results suggest that as the use of ICT related e-government increases corruption decreases. We also find that the impact of e-government is higher in developing countries than in developed countries for the seven-year period between 2003 and 2010.

This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.We study a banking model in which banks invest in a riskless asset and compete in both deposit and risky loan markets. The model predicts that as competition increases, both loans and assets increase; however, the effect on the loans-to-assets ratio is ambiguous. Similarly, as competition increases, the probability of bank failure can either increase or decrease. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003, and a panel data set of about 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. With both samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of competition, and that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively and significantly related to measures of competition. Furthermore, several loan loss measures commonly employed in the literature are negatively and significantly related to measures of bank competition. Thus, there is no evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition seems to foster banks' willingness to lend. JEL Classification Numbers: G21, G32, L1

We investigate whether managers' religious affiliations affect corporate decisions. We hand collect data on the religious affiliations of chief executive officers (CEOs) and find that firms with Catholic CEOs have less leverage, issue debt less often, increase business and geographic diversification, and invest less than firms with Protestant CEOs. We also find that the decisions of Catholic CEOs are associated with lower firm value. These corporate actions are also reflected in the CEOs’ personal decisions, such as owning fewer company stocks and playing less risky sports.

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