Weak mediators normally need to borrow leverage from more powerful players to provide efficient mediation. This situation requires strong co-operation between the weak mediator and more powerful actors or coalitions involved in a peace process. But what if this co-operation fails? This analysis demonstrates how lack of productive co-operation with the United States negatively affected Norway's nine-year long attempt to mediate in the conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam between 2000 and 2009. More specifically, it explores how the United States views on terrorism in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 limited Norway's room for diplomatic manoeuvre. Based on a unique set of classified sources from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and interviews with key actors, the analysis demonstrates how diverging perceptions of a conflict can make mediation painfully challenging. Early in 2000, Norway's foreign minister, Knut Vollebaek, and MP Erik Solheim -soon to become chief mediator in Sri Lanka -travelled to Colombo officially to accept a Norwegian mandate as facilitator in the conflict between the government of Sri Lanka and the secessionist Liberation

Can weak third parties contribute to ripening conflicts for resolution despite their lack of leverage? According to the core principles of ripeness theory, mediators with leverage have a clear advantage when it comes to ripening. What is often overlooked in the literature, however, is the important ways a weak mediator can contribute to ripening as well. This article explores two noteworthy cases of weak third party ripening – the Norwegian roles in the Oslo channel between Israel and the Palestinians, and between theurngguerrilla and the government in Guatemala. These cases demonstrate how careful interventions by weak third parties can help disputants see negotiations as a way out both in preliminary and later phases of negotiations. However, we also argue that weak third parties should not get involved in ripening unless they can call on a mediator with more leverage once substantial negotiations begin.

This article explores the political interplay between Norway's national oil company Statoil and its government during a period when a truly global debate over climate emerged. The article sheds light on how the climate issue concerned the relationship between a Nordic state and its most important state-controlled enterprise, and exposes how Statoil responded to increasing calls for decarbonization while being privileged in climate policy-making processes. Furthermore, the article explores the origin and shortcomings of the puzzling argument about Norway's 'environment-friendly' oil and gas, and discusses how this argument helped enable Statoil and the rest of the industry to continue with business as usual despite growing social demands for the oil industry to step up its climate efforts.

No abstract

Denne artikkelen redegjør for og diskuterer freds- og forsoningspolitikkens ambisjoner, hovedlinjer og posisjon innad i utenrikspolitikken under Ine Eriksen Søreides periode som utenriksminister fra 2017 til 2021. Artikkelen argumenterer for at to politiske hovedspor tegnet seg for fredspolitikken i løpet av disse fire årene. Dette er fredspolitikkens rolle som sikkerhetspolitisk verktøy og det multilaterale sporet, ofte omtalt som FN-sporet. Artikkelen tar utgangspunkt i aktuelle stortingsmeldinger og årlige redegjørelser og setter dette i sammenheng med konkret innsats i utvalgte fredsprosesser og utvikling i internasjonal politikk. Abstract in EnglishThe Primacy of Security Policy: Norwegian Peace and Reconciliation Policy During Ine Eriksen Søreide’s TermThis article explains and discusses the ambitions, main features and position of Norway’s peace and reconciliation policy during Ine Eriksen Søreide’s period as foreign minister from 2017 to 2021. The article identifies two main political tracks for the peace policy during these four years. The first is the role of peace policy as a security policy tool and the second is the multilateral track, often referred to as the UN track. The article uses parliamentary white papers and annual parliamentary accounts as contextual background for the analysis of selected peace efforts, and connects this to general developments in international politics.