Although eyewitness memory and identification have captured substantial research interest in the past decades, an understanding of the types and prevalence of errors typically made by eyewitnesses is lacking. The purpose of the present research was to begin the development of a taxonomy of eyewitness error, employing standardized stimuli and established techniques. Respondents were exposed to a crime scene modeled on SWAT-training scenarios for systematically varied exposure times, and were then asked to describe what they had seen. The stimuli and questions employed were prepared with the aid of senior police field training officers. As anticipated, eyewitness performance in general was subject to a variety of inaccuracies. Physical errors, such as mistakes in the clothing or physical characteristics of the perpetrator, or in details of the environmental context, predominated. However, other less-expected errors were also observed: in relatively low numbers of cases, witnesses inferred emotional states or intent on the part of the perpetrator or victim. Some contributed wholly artificial backstories, reported the future actions of the perpetrator or victim as memories, or even inserted themselves into the scene. The pattern of results was shown to interact with exposure time, gender of the perpetrator, and the presence or absence of weapons in the scene. The results of this study are consistent with reconfigurative theory dating to Bartlett (1932), with subsequent research, and with more recent work under the aegis of Gestalt/Feature-Intensive Processing theory. These findings provide information on types and prevalence of eyewitness error which should prove useful in investigative and courtroom settings.

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In the absence of relevant information in working memory during decision consideration, respondents tend to rely on a style of cognitive processing that may result in premature or inaccurate decision making (M. J. Sharps, 2003). M. J. Sharps and S. S. Martin (2002) demonstrated this effect in executive decision making. In the present study, the authors extended these methods to decisions about environmental issues. Respondents rated decisions about issues such as overpopulation, energy policy, and food production in the presence or absence of simple pertinent information. The presence of such information in the immediate context of environmental decisions, and therefore in working memory, significantly improved respondents' ability to understand negative decision consequences. These results demonstrate the importance of contextual information in environmental decision making.

Many college students experience difficulties in basic academic skills. Recent research suggests that much of this difficulty may lie in heuristic competency--the ability to use and successfully manage general cognitive strategies. In the present study, the authors evaluated this possibility. They compared participants' performance on a practice California Basic Educational Skills Test and on a series of questions in the natural sciences with heuristic and algorithmic performance on a series of mathematics and reading comprehension exercises. Heuristic competency in mathematics was associated with better scores in science and mathematics. Verbal and algorithmic skills were associated with better reading comprehension. These results indicate the importance of including heuristic training in educational contexts and highlight the importance of a relatively domain-specific approach to questions of cognition in higher education.

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