Existing work on the effects of social comparison on envy and generosity typically involves manipulation of social comparison with respect to dimensions that carry personal meaning and reflect upon the self, for example, performance, ability, or achievement. In the current work, we examine the effects of social comparison based on a purely arbitrary, manipulated situation. We measure malicious envy via monetary decisions that have real consequences for the target of comparison, in place of a self‐reported questionnaire. In addition, we test the effects of the preliminary social comparison on generosity in a subsequent and ostensibly unrelated situation. In Experiment 1 we demonstrate the effect of randomly manipulated upward social comparison on a monetary allocation decision, and we establish the link between this allocation decision and malicious envy. In Experiment 2 we show that upward comparison affects not only malicious envy towards the target of the comparison but also decreases generosity towards a third party in a subsequent, ostensibly unrelated situation. Experiment 3 shows the effect of this type of social comparison, beyond a specific direction, on reducing generosity towards a third party.

Following previous research on various aspects of contests, we aim to explore how taking part in a contest affects subsequent behavior. We focus on whether the experience of having just competed in a contest, beyond its outcome, would have an impact on other-regarding decisions towards an individual who was not part of the preliminary contest. In addition, in light of inconclusive results in the existing literature regarding the effect of contest outcome on subsequent prosociality, we reexamine this effect. In line with our hypothesis, participation in a contest was found to reduce prosociality. Additionally, we found that winning a contest reduced prosociality only when decisions were framed as “giving” decisions and not as “dividing” decisions. This finding suggests that the effect of contest outcome may depend on specific elements of the presented situations.

No abstract

The present research introduces the seller's status-signaling fallacy: Sellers tend to use status signals to attract buyers, but buyers actually prefer sellers who do not signal status. Across six studies we demonstrate the effect using different operationalizations of status and various products for sale. Study 1 demonstrates this effect in contexts where sellers and buyers make initial sales connections. Study 2 replicates the effect in transaction situations where the buyer actually chooses the seller from whom to buy. Studies 3a and 3b reveal a novel mediation model according to which the seller's status signaling is perceived by buyers as an unsuccessful impression management attempt, which ultimately leads those buyers to prefer sellers who do not try to impress them through status signaling. Finally, studies 4a and 4b demonstrate the robustness of the effect in an incentivized setting and explore boundary conditions. This work enriches the growing literature on status signals in two ways. First, it shows that sellers mistakenly believe that such signaling is beneficial for them. Second, contrary to accepted wisdom, it shows that such signaling repels buyers. In the gig-economy era, where everyone can become a seller in the marketplace, these findings are highly applicable.

No abstract