This article reexamines the venerable concept of indirect rule. We argue, drawing on evidence from colonial and postcolonial South Asia, that indirect rule actually represented a diverse set of governance forms that need to be clearly distinguished. Using a new typology of varieties of governance, we show that colonial governments established suzerain, hybrid, and de jure governance, in addition to direct rule across territories, based on the incentives and constraints of the state. The repertoire of governance forms narrowed and changed but did not disappear during decolonization, showing that the postcolonial state had powerful reasons to maintain forms of heterodox governance. Dramatic shifts, alongside enduring continuity, challenge a simple narrative of path dependence and the adherence to tradition, instead showing that governments have made conscious choices about how to govern. We conclude by discussing the implications of these arguments for broader understandings of state power.

No abstract

Patchwork States argues that the subnational politics of conflict and competition in South Asian countries have roots in the history of uneven state formation under colonial rule. Colonial India contained a complex landscape of different governance arrangements and state-society relations. After independence, postcolonial governments revised colonial governance institutions, but only with partial success. The book argues that contemporary India and Pakistan can be usefully understood as patchwork states, with enduring differences in state capacity and state-society relations within their national territories. The complex nature of territorial governance in these countries shapes patterns of political violence, including riots and rebellions, as well as variations in electoral competition and development across the political geography of the Indian subcontinent. By bridging past and present, this book can transform our understanding of both the legacies of colonial rule and the historical roots of violent politics, in South Asia and beyond.

No abstract

The Pakistan Army is a politically important organization, yet its opacity has hindered academic research. We use open sources to construct unique new data on the backgrounds, careers, and post-retirement activities of post-1971 Corps Commanders and Directors-General of Inter-Services Intelligence. We provide evidence of bureaucratic predictability and professionalism while officers are in service. After retirement, we show little involvement in electoral politics but extensive involvement in military-linked corporations, state employment, and other positions of influence. This combination provides Pakistan's military with an unusual blend of professional discipline internally and political power externally -even when not directly ruling.Pakistan's army is central to questions of local, regional, and global stability. We investigate the organizational politics of the Pakistan Army using unique individual-level data on the corps commanders of the Army and Directors-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) since 1971.The corps commanders are of enormous importance, working with the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) to launch coups, withdraw from power, forge external and internal security policies, and shape the politics of Pakistan. 1 We gathered data from open sources on the personal and career backgrounds of the corps commanders and ISI directors-general, their trajectories within the military, and what they did in retirement, both immediately after leaving service and later in retirement. These data provide systematic, detailed information on the military's elite personnel and, crucially, how it has managed to keep them largely on board with a complex, politically demanding project. The data have numerous, important limitations -but they are also, to the best of our knowledge, unique in the Pakistani case, and among a small number of similar studies world-wide. 3 We first show strong evidence of high levels of bureaucratic institutionalization and professionalism within the Pakistan Army. Despite its recurrent praetorianism and ongoing political influence, the rules within the organization seem to be generally followed, with limited factionalism and consistent promotion pathways. There is the stark contrast between this rational-bureaucratic organization and other political militaries, like those in Thailand, 1970s Bangladesh, 1960s Nigeria, or 1990s Indonesia, racked by internal fratricide, plagued by factional rivalries, or vulnerable to divide-and-rule strategies by ruling elites.1 This includes the nine standard corps, plus Army Air Defence and Army Strategic Forces Command. This comes to 183 officers over 45 years. There have been 18 DG's ISI, of whom a number were also corps commanders.