This article examines how state-linked religious actors negotiate religious demands in a secular authoritarian state. There is a prevalent assumption that such religious actors lack the agency to affect state decisions. I do not seek to challenge that proposition, rather to qualify it by identifying the scope and extent of their authority. Taking the state as an autonomous actor, I examine fatwas or official religious edicts in Singapore through the lens of ‘policy feedback’, which analyses how the bureaucratisation of religious institution created new legal and bureaucratic channels that shape state policies. This paper aims to primarily answer the following question: What role do fatwas play in shaping statist interpretation of religion? I answer this by looking at the historical development of religious bureaucracy in Singapore – which includes the fatwa institution – and analysing the role of fatwas in relation to state policies. I argue that the bureaucratisation of religion not only regulates religious demands, but creates a juncture for religious institutions to inform and contest statist version of Islam though policy feedback, a concept that has thus far been only partially applied to economic issues. Policy feedback explains how religious demands are negotiated at the bureaucratic level and is particularly instructive in clarifying the discourse between the state and the fatwa institutions, which underlines that the policies and programmes of the autonomous state can be influenced by the very demands of religious bureaucrats. This paper also introduces Statist Islam as an original concept with which to conceptualise the amalgamation of statist and religious interests, and considers how the informal authority of fatwas continues to function beyond the legal and bureaucratic restrictions set by the state.

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The results of Malaysia's general election held on 8 March 2008 was nothing short of monumental. By winning five state legislatures and denying the incumbent governing coalition its hitherto routine two-thirds parliamentary majority, the performance of the opposition, swayed by the contribution of the new media, raised hopes that Malaysian politics had turned a corner. Following the elections, the popular discursive terrain in Malaysia was awash with talk of a “new politics” that had emerged, and that transcended the traditional narratives of race, religion, and communalism. The purpose of this paper is to examine the veracity of these claims in relation to the nature and conduct of politics in Malaysia. It argues that, three years after the 2008 elections, the communal narrative remains as forceful a factor in Malaysian politics despite the presence of a multi-ethnic opposition coalition and the hope engendered by the emergence of the new media as an equalizing factor that has eroded the incumbent's traditional hegemonic control over information.

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The opposition Islamist PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, or Pan Malaysian Islamic Party) is one of the oldest political parties in Malaysia. Inspired by Egypt’s Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood [MB]), PAS is also influenced by occurrences in the Middle East; following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, its leaders revamped their organizational structure to entrust key decisions to religious scholars. The ramifications of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, arguably one of the most significant Middle Eastern political events in recent times, thus deserves a closer look. This short article attempts to look at this revolution’s possible impact on Islamists in Malaysia. I argue that Malaysia had already undergone its own version of a revolution in the 1998 reformasi (reformation) due to the shared characteristics between the two events: both (1) shared the same premise of alleged political injustice; (2) provided opportunities for Islamists to influence the political discourse, with the difference that in Egypt there was a political vacuum; and (3) utilized the Internet heavily to rally the masses. However, due to Malaysia’s freer democratic and electoral processes, political changes there will not be as abrupt as in Egypt. Furthermore, both Egypt’s revolution and Malaysia’s reformasi have hardly ended; the former is a tumultuous ongoing process of battling for the legitimacy of rule by appealing to the masses, while the latter is an ongoing process of appealing to voters in order to come to rule.