The internet is the home for huge volumes of useful data that is constantly being created making it difficult for users to find information relevant to them. Recommendation System is a special type of information filtering system adapted by online vendors to provide recommendations to their customers based on their requirements. Collaborative filtering is one of the most widely used recommendation systems; unfortunately, it is prone to shilling/profile injection attacks. Such attacks alter the recommendation process to promote or demote a particular product. Over the years, multiple attack models and detection techniques have been developed to mitigate the problem. This paper aims to be a comprehensive survey of the shilling attack models, detection attributes, and detection algorithms. Additionally, we unravel and classify the intrinsic traits of the injected profiles that are exploited by the detection algorithms, which has not been explored in previous works. We also briefly discuss recent works in the development of robust algorithms that alleviate the impact of shilling attacks, attacks on multi-criteria systems, and intrinsic feedback based collaborative filtering methods.

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Collaborative Filtering (CF) is a popular recommendation system that makes recommendations based on similar users' preferences. Though it is widely used, CF is prone to Shilling/Profile Injection attacks, where fake profiles are injected into the CF system to alter its outcome. Most of the existing shilling attacks do not work on online systems and cannot be efficiently implemented in real-world applications. In this paper, we introduce an efficient Multi-Armed-Bandit-based reinforcement learning method to practically execute online shilling attacks. Our method works by reducing the uncertainty associated with the item selection process and finds the most optimal items to enhance attack reach. Such practical online attacks open new avenues for research in building more robust recommender systems. We treat the recommender system as a black box, making our method effective irrespective of the type of CF used. Finally, we also experimentally test our approach against popular state-of-the-art shilling attacks.