As a decisive parameter of network robustness and network economy, the capacity of network edges can directly affect the operation stability and the construction cost of the network. This paper proposes a multilevel load–capacity optimal relationship (MLCOR) model that can substantially improve the network economy on the premise of network safety. The model is verified in artificially created networks including free-scale networks, small-world networks, and in the real network structure of the Shanghai Metro network as well. By numerical simulation, it is revealed that under the premise of ensuring the stability of the network from the destruction caused by initial internal or external damage on edge, the MLCOR model can effectively reduce the cost of the entire network compared to the other two linear load–capacity models regardless of what extent of the destruction that the network edges suffer initially. It is also proved that there exists an optimal tunable parameter and the corresponding optimal network cost for any BA and NW network topology, which can provide the reference for setting reasonable capacities for network edges in a real network at the stage of network planning and construction, promoting security and stability of network operation.

City management involves complex interactions between the manager (administrator), who supervises urban appearance and environmental sanitation, and the managed (speculator), who works in urban areas and is subject to management ordinances. This article provides an iterated game framework for analyzing the extent to which zero-determinant strategies can be used to optimize the intensity decision of supervisory action against municipal code violations, thus enhancing administrative efficiency. To account for characteristics of the public affairs context, it is assumed that each player in our model chooses from a finite set of discrete and random courses of game strategy. As our model constitutes a major extension to the seminal Press and Dyson (2012) model, we resort to the theory of stochastic process to prove the existence of multiple zero-determinant strategies when players can adopt many strategies in the iterated game. Various numerical examples are presented to validate such strategies’ optimality. Our finding is that, given the probability of adopting a particular strategy, an urban administrator can unilaterally (i) set the speculators’ expected payoff to a level equaling to the opportunity cost of abiding by the law and (ii) let their own expected surplus payoff exceed the speculators. Finally, important policy implications can be derived based on these analyses and conclusions.