No abstract

The courts have hitherto played a remarkably limited role in the working of devolution in the United Kingdom. In this respect, the UK has been an exception to practice in most federal or decentralised systems, where the courts have tended to assume a prominent role in adjudicating intergovernmental disputes. This article examines whether political congruence contributed to this minimal role for the courts in IGR. It argues that additional factors are also at play: the limited role accorded to lawyers and legal issues in the UK's system of government, the flexibility of the devolution settlements, and the political nature of the UK's constitution, which make it both possible and desirable to resolve intergovernmental disputes by different means. While the courts are likely to become more prominent as a result of third‐party litigation, particularly as devolved legislatures become more active, the limited role of the courts in most intergovernmental matters appears unlikely to change.

No abstract

No abstract